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ABSTRACT
This Article explores how the anticompetitive impact of a zoning ordinance is assessed under the antitrust laws and substantive due process and
concludes that neither is likely to satisfactorily curb the anticompetitive
impact of commercial land use regulation. The Article highlights the distinction between a local government’s zoning power and its more general
police power. For rational basis review to act as a meaningful check on
zoning power, as distinguished from more general police powers, this Article contends that such review must require a local government to produce
evidence of a causal link between the zoning action and the stated government interest. Rejecting antitrust law as the proper doctrinal vehicle
through which to curb the anticompetitive impact of commercial zoning
restrictions, this Article proposes a three-part administrative procedure,
grounded in notions of due process and the legitimate exercise of a locality’s zoning power, to reduce the frequency with which local governments
impose socially inefficient restrictions on commercial land use. Finally,
the Article introduces the concept of an economic impact statement.
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INTRODUCTION

R

ESTRICTIONS on land use can impact economic competition by constraining or altering the supply of key real estate inputs in the provision of goods and services. Zoning restrictions and other land use
regulations often impose zoning restrictions and other land use regulations to satisfy public objectives other than competition. Residents, for
example, often want commercial businesses to be located outside of residential areas. Likewise, a locality can prevent market entry by a potential
competitor on the grounds that the entrant, while increasing economic
competition, will generate various social costs such as traffic congestion or
environmental pollution. Indeed, in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising,1 the United States Supreme Court stated that “the very purpose
of zoning regulation is to displace unfettered business freedom in a manner that regularly has the effect of preventing normal acts of competition,
particularly on the part of new entrants.”2 Assessing the overall impact of
land use restrictions requires a difficult balancing of the anticompetitive
harm against the social benefits of accomplishing other public policy
objectives. This Article explores this complex balancing in the specific
context of commercial land use regulation.
Part I begins by describing what this Article views as the key challenge
in the regulation of commercial land use, which serves as the principal
focus of this paper. Specifically, this Part contends that regulators of commercial land use must perform a complex balancing of social costs and
benefits to determine if certain restrictions on commercial land use, on
net, increase social welfare, weighing the potential anticompetitive effects
of restrictive zoning against the negative externalities that are eliminated
by such legislative action. As theoretical background, Section A presents
two simple models of zoning. The first model justifies zoning as a mechanism to reduce negative externalities created by land use conflicts.3 The
second model views restrictive zoning as a means by which incumbent
businesses can maintain or enlarge monopoly power in a local geographic
market.4 To better understand this balancing of social costs and benefits,
Section B also provides two distinct hypotheticals as stylized examples of
the corresponding social benefits and costs, respectively.
Part II explores how the anticompetitive impact of a zoning ordinance is assessed under current law. Two avenues of attack are generally
available to challenge the validity of a zoning ordinance. The first avenue
of attack is antitrust laws. Under this approach, the challenger argues that
the zoning restriction harms economic competition in violation of federal
1. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
2. Id. at 373.
3. For more information on the first model of zoning, refer to discussion of
the Chicago School of Political Economy in Section II.B.2.a.
4. For more information on the second model of zoning, refer to discussion
of the Virginia School of Political Economy in Section II.B.2.b.
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or state antitrust laws. The second avenue of attack is substantive due process. Under this approach, the challenger argues that the zoning restriction is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Neither
attack is likely to succeed, however. In general, antitrust law exempts local
governments from antitrust liability if the governing body exercises its legislative powers to enact a regulation with anticompetitive impact, meaning
that a zoning ordinance cannot be challenged under antitrust law. Likewise, although courts have recognized that a locality’s zoning power
should not be used to regulate economic competition among private businesses, judicial scrutiny of the potential anticompetitive impact of a zoning
action under rational basis review is weak and can be easily circumvented
by local governments.
Part II further highlights the distinction between a local government’s
zoning power and its more general police power. For the rationally related requirement to serve as a meaningful check on zoning power, as distinguished from a local government’s more general police powers, this Article
contends that such review must require a local government to provide evidence of a causal link between the zoning action and the stated government interest. This differs from standard rational basis review of more
general police power actions, which can be based upon “rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”5 As discussed in Part III,
local governments should be compelled to produce some type of concrete
empirical or statistical evidence to support the existence of a causal link
between the zoning restriction and the stated government interest for the
zoning action to represent a valid exercise of zoning power under rational
basis review. Given the omnipresent specter of anticompetitive impact, a
local government cannot merely posit a plausible causal link, blithely stating, without additional evidentiary support, that the zoning restriction will
promote a legitimate public interest. Local governments must do more.
Part III further contends that the current legal safeguards, including
antitrust law and rational basis review as presently applied, are insufficient
to safeguard local communities against the anticompetitive effects of commercial land use regulation. Rejecting antitrust law as the proper doctrinal vehicle through which to curb the anticompetitive impact of
commercial zoning restrictions, Section III.B.2 suggests a three-part administrative procedure, grounded in notions of due process and the legitimate exercise of zoning power, to reduce the frequency with which local
governments impose socially inefficient restrictions on commercial land
use. This Section introduces the concept of an economic impact statement in connection with the anticompetitive impact of commercial land
use regulation. As part of the three-part procedure, a business owner who
challenges the validity of a zoning ordinance that prohibits or restricts
commercial land use can make out a prima facie case of anticompetitive
impact by submitting to the governing body an “economic impact state5. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
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ment” that establishes the extent to which the proposed zoning action acts
as a barrier to entry. Importantly, to establish a prima facie case of anticompetitive impact, the challenger need not prove an “antitrust injury”
under the proposed framework. Instead, the business owner need only
submit an economic impact statement that displays where the business can
locate in the jurisdiction given the proposed zoning ordinance. Lastly,
this Article briefly concludes.
I. PROBLEM

OF

COMMERCIAL LAND USE

This Part describes the key challenge in the regulation of commercial
land use that serves as the principal focus of this paper. Specifically, this
Part contends that regulators of commercial land use must perform a complex balancing of social costs and benefits to determine if a restriction on
commercial land use increases social welfare, on net, weighing the potential anticompetitive effects of the restrictive zoning action against the negative externalities that are eliminated by such legislative action.
A.

Theoretical Background

As theoretical background, this Section describes two models of zoning. The first model explains zoning as a mechanism to decrease negative
externalities generated by land use conflicts.6 The second model sees restrictive zoning as a means by which incumbent private businesses can
maintain or expand monopoly power in a specific geographic market.
1.

Zoning as Externality Control Mechanism

Zoning is often conceived as a collective property right that protects
the value of properties and enhances the efficiency of resource allocation
in metropolitan areas.7 Under this view, zoning functions as a top-down
regulatory mechanism to reduce expected conflicts related to land use including, for example, nuisance litigation. Both legislatures and courts
have consistently articulated, in express terms, the close link between zoning and nuisance, justifying zoning as a mechanism that spatially orders
land uses to minimize potential instances of nuisance.8 As the United
States Supreme Court noted in Euclid v. Ambler Realty,9 “a nuisance may be
merely a right thing in the wrong place,—like a pig in the parlor instead
6. See e.g., Robert B. Fiske, Real Property: The Effect of Zoning Ordinances on the
Law of Nuisance, 54 MICH. L. REV. 266 (1955).
7. See, e.g., William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for its
Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB. STUD. 317 (2004); Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Government, 12 URB. STUD. 205 (1975); Wallace E.
Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values: An
Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. POL. ECON. 957
(1969). See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS (1985).
8. See generally Fiske, supra note 6.
9. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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of the barnyard.”10 Because zoning normally shields any activity that is
properly conducted at a place authorized for that activity from a private
nuisance claim, zoning allows localities to minimize the transaction costs
that would otherwise arise in the private resolution of land use conflicts
(e.g., litigation costs).11
Many zoning restrictions, however, seek to regulate land use conflicts
that extend beyond nuisance law.12 Local governments, for example,
often implement zoning restrictions that impose a building density limit in
an express effort to reduce traffic congestion in the local community. In
general, nuisance law does not hold a driver of an automobile liable for
the potential negative externalities incurred by other residents because of
increased traffic congestion: driving does not represent the type of behavior in which the law identifies a “wrongdoer” who is engaged in harmful
conduct towards others.13 Likewise, a majority of states permit zoning
based purely upon aesthetic factors.14 In this way, zoning can be regarded
as a form of regulation designed to restrict not just wrongful conduct that
would otherwise constitute private nuisance, but a much larger set of land
use conflicts involving negative externalities more broadly defined than
under the common law of nuisance.15
2.

Anticompetitive Effects of Zoning

Alternatively, zoning can be viewed as a tool employed by incumbent
businesses to maintain or enlarge monopoly power in a local geographic
market.16 In many industries, competition takes place at a very narrow
10. Id. at 388.
11. See, e.g., Neil K. Komesar, Housing, Zoning, and the Public Interest, in PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 218, 219–21 (Burton A.
Weisbrod et al. eds., 1978).
12. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules,
and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 719–60 (1973).
13. See, e.g., Ralph Slovenko, Desocialization by Automobile, 54 WAYNE L. REV.
1767, 1788–89 (2008). In fact, this type of behavior aligns well with Coase’s view of
externalities as having a “reciprocal nature,” meaning that a wrongdoer and victim
cannot be categorically identified. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON., Oct. 1960, at 1, 2; see also Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089 (1972).
14. See, e.g., Georgette C. Poindexter, Light, Air, or Manhattanization?: Communal Aesthetics in Zoning Central City Real Estate Development, 78 B.U. L. REV. 445,
483–88 (1998) (discussing the legitimacy of aesthetic zoning in the absence of
recognition for aesthetic nuisance); Kenneth Regan, You Can’t Build that Here: The
Constitutionality of Aesthetic Zoning and Architectural Review, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1013
(1990); see also Mark Bobrowski, Scenic Landscape Protection Under the Police Power, 22
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 697, 744 (1995) (arguing that visual resource protection’s
importance “makes it a [public] purpose that may stand alone as an exercise of the
police power”).
15. See, e.g., Amnon Lehavi, Zoning and Market Externalities, 44 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 361, 372 (2017).
16. See, e.g., J. Fred Giertz, A Note of Zoning and Monopoly, 8 GROWTH & CHANGE
50, 50 (1977).
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geographic scale.17 To maximize profit in these narrowly defined geographic markets, incumbent firms can take steps to prevent entry of a competitor. Several municipalities in the United States, for example, have
placed restrictions on the entry of “formula” businesses characterized by a
“standardized array of services or merchandise, trademark, logo, service
mark, symbol, décor, architecture, layout, uniform, or similar standardized
feature,” and generally are designed to include such national retailers as
Wal-Mart, McDonalds, or Starbucks.18
Typically, these land use restrictions are justified as a means by which
to preserve an appropriate balance of small-, medium-, and large-scale
businesses in the jurisdiction.19 As discussed in Section II.B, to justify such
a zoning restriction on commercial land use, a local government ordinarily must show how the restriction promotes the public interest and establish that the restriction is not merely a pretext for preserving the status
quo in the service of politically powerful local economic interests.20 Although restrictions on the entry of “formula businesses” have generally
withstood judicial scrutiny, a few courts have questioned the legitimacy of
this type of land use regulation if comparable restrictions have not been
levied upon other large businesses that do not have standardized features,
suggesting that the true motive for such restrictions is a targeted policy
against specific retailers, and not a general, broad-based policy on the
preservation of small businesses or the viability of a central business district.21 As some scholars have convincingly argued, strictly anticompetitive
purpose can be all too easily concealed in the guise of a more general
social welfare analysis, in which anticompetitive harm is weighed against
otherwise legitimate government interests that are, in fact, entirely
pretextual.22
Empirically, a small, but important, literature generally supports the
claim that land use restrictions, such as those imposed on large retailers
like Wal-Mart, can have significant anticompetitive impact.23 Land use
17. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner & William M. Landes, Market Power in Antitrust
Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 963 (1981).
18. Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 844, 845 (11th Cir.
2008) (quoting ISLAMORADA, FLA., ORDINANCE 02-02 §§ 6.4.3–4(a–b) (2002)).
19. See generally Patricia E. Salkin, Municipal Regulation of Formula Businesses:
Creating and Protecting Communities, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1251 (2008).
20. See infra Section II.B.
21. See, e.g., Island Silver & Spice, 542 F.3d at 847–49 (reasoning that the goal
of preserving Islamorada’s “small town” features does not stand if other large nonstandardized retailers are allowed and holding that the special limits on formula
retail violate the Dormant Commerce Clause’s protection of interstate commerce).
22. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, On Wal-Mart: Doing Good by Doing Nothing, 39
CONN. L. REV. 1287, 1293–94 (2007) (arguing that labor unions have used municipal zoning regulations to prevent the entry of Wal-Mart into local labor markets).
23. See, e.g., Panle Jia, What Happens When Wal-Mart Comes to Town: An Empirical
Analysis of the Discount Retailing Industry, 76 ECONOMETRICA 1263, 1291–1306 (2008)
(investigating effect of Wal-Mart and Kmart’s entry on small discount retailers using a fully structural approach, and finding that Wal-Mart’s expansion from the
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regulations intended to protect city centers, for example, can potentially
incentivize owners to open stores that are smaller than what both consumers and sellers would optimally prefer. In a study of the British supermarket industry, for example, the authors show that size and location
regulations, set forth in the government’s Planning Policy Guidance, imposed suboptimal store characteristics on both consumers and firms in
requiring these groups to focus on small rather than more valued middlesized stores.24 A more recent study shows that independent retailers were
harmed by certain land use measures taken to prevent market entry by
large stores. These legislatively-created barriers to entry incentivized large
retail chains to invest in smaller, more centrally located stores that competed more directly with independent retailers and, ultimately, accelerated the decline of the very retailers whom the legislation was designed to
protect.25 A few empirical studies have examined land use regulations
that require firms to invest additional time or effort to obtain permission
to enter a market and have confirmed that such restrictions, in serving as a
barrier to entry, can have a significant anticompetitive impact.26 For example, using microdata on midsized chain hotels in Texas, one empirical
study demonstrated that land use regulation served to decrease the
probability of market entry, with consumers incurring the cost of zoning
indirectly in the form of higher prices charged by incumbent firms that
benefited from greater market power.27
late 1980s to the late 1990s explains about fifty to seventy percent of net negative
change in number of small discount retailers); see also Daniel Shoag & Stan
Veuger, Shops and the City: Evidence on Local Externalities and Local Government Policy
from Big-Box Bankruptcies, 100 REV. ECON. & STAT. 440, 444–45 (2018) (finding that
directly competing retailers are economically harmed by the presence of a big-box
store while the overall pecuniary effects of large retailers are positive); David Merriman et al., The Impact of an Urban WalMart Store on Area Businesses: The Chicago
Case, 26 ECON. DEV. Q. 321 (2012); cf. John C. Haltiwanger et al., Mom-and-Pop Meet
Big-Box: Complements or Substitutes?, 67 J. URB. ECON. 116 (2010) (showing that impact of big-box entry on other retailers is characterized by considerable heterogeneity where negative employment effects can be found only for stores that operate
in immediate geographic area and same detailed industry of new big-box). See
generally P. Ford, Excessive Competition in the Retail Trades. Changes in the Numbers of
Shops, 1901-1931, 45 ECON. J. 501 (1935).
24. See Howard Smith, Store Characteristics in Retail Oligopoly, 37 RAND J. ECON.
416, 428–29 (2006); see also Rachel Griffith & Heike Harmgart, Supermarkets Competition in England and Planning Regulation, 22 INT. REV. RETAIL, DISTRIBUTION & CONSUMER RES., Feb. 2012, at 1, 12–14 (finding that planning regulation has a
statistically significant impact on number of firms operating in region, although
the effects are halved once observable differences across local authorities in population density, employment, and distance from town centers are taken into
account).
25. See Raffaella Sadun, Does Planning Regulation Protect Independent Retailers?,
97 REV. ECON. & STAT. 983, 994–97 (2015).
26. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
27. See Junichi Suzuki, Land Use Regulation as a Barrier to Entry: Evidence from the
Texas Lodging Industry, 54 INT’L ECON. REV. 495, 509–14 (2013); cf. David B. Ridley
et al., Retail Zoning and Competition (Jan. 14, 2011) (working paper) (presenting
empirical results supporting hypothesis that tighter commercial zoning leads to
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Problem to be Solved

In practice, both models of zoning are likely correct in that zoning
can be simultaneously a mechanism to reduce negative externalities created by land use conflicts and a means by which incumbent businesses can
maintain or enlarge monopoly power in a local geographic market. The
challenge for land use policy is how best to balance these corresponding
social costs and benefits to determine if a local land use regulation, on net,
increases social welfare.
1.

Two Hypotheticals

To better understand this complex balancing of social costs and benefits, this Subsection provides two distinct hypotheticals as stylized examples
of the corresponding social benefits and costs, respectively.
a.

Reducing Negative Externalities Through Land Use Regulation

Consider a small town located a few miles from a busy interstate highway. The local government must decide whether to allow a national fastfood chain-style restaurant to open within its jurisdiction. Most people in
town strongly oppose the opening of this type of restaurant, concerned
that the local community will incur several distinct social harms, including
increased traffic congestion, environmental pollution (including noise
and litter), and blight, as well as a rise in low-level crime rates. Many in
the community are also concerned that young people will frequent this
restaurant and develop bad eating habits that will negatively contribute to
the long-run health and well-being of the community. At first blush, the
overall lack of local demand for this type of business might suggest that
this restaurant is unlikely to survive in the long-run and that normal competitive free market forces can be safely relied upon to prevent entry by
this potential market participant (provided the business owner correctly
anticipates the lack of future demand). In other words, government intervention in the form of restrictive zoning is not necessary in this local market because natural free market forces, in the form of a lack of consumer
demand, ensure the socially efficient outcome—in this case, the restaurant not opening.
Suppose, however, that the patrons of this chain-style restaurant are
primarily motorists traveling along the nearby interstate, in addition to a
small minority of local town residents, and that the revenues generated by
these customers is enough to render the restaurant profitable in the longrun despite the absence of strong local consumer demand. Even though
the restaurant imposes substantial social harm on the local community
and is not wanted by most of its members, the restaurant is still able to
operate profitably due to its proximity to the interstate, which guarantees
fewer rivals, but that, overall, a firm faces more price competition because of spatial proximity forced by zoning).
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a steady revenue stream from customers who do not bear directly the social costs generated by the restaurant. In this way, private market forces
cannot be relied upon to prevent a business from opening that makes the
community worse off: the business creates social harms that it does not
internalize, and consumer demand by those who do not incur these external costs is sufficiently large to allow the restaurant to earn a profit.
Characterized in this manner, the problem addressed by commercial
land use regulation is one of negative externalities: neither the restaurant
nor its customers internalize the negative external costs created by the
business. Zoning represents a solution to this externality problem,
preventing socially suboptimal development when market forces are not
sufficient to deter market entry.28 Rather than making the restaurant internalize the external costs imposed on the local community, the town
uses zoning to prevent the restaurant from opening in the first instance on
the assumption that such market entry, if permitted, will leave the local
community, taken as a whole, worse off.
b.

Reducing Local Competition Through Land Use Regulation

Consider again this same small town located a few miles from a busy
interstate that must decide whether to allow a national fast-food chain-style
restaurant to open. Suppose that most people in the town are now
strongly in favor of permitting the restaurant to open. Dining options in
town are severely limited, especially affordable lower-priced options, and
this restaurant, will benefit consumers by expanding the set of available
choices. Less saliently, market entry will also benefit consumers in constraining the pricing power of incumbent restaurants, especially those that
offer similar lower-priced fare such as the local diner and pizza parlor. If
one of these restaurants raises its prices toward monopoly levels, then its
customers will gradually migrate to its competitors in the local market,
including the market entrant. In the usual manner, greater market competition, therefore, serves as a check upon the potential exercise of monopoly power, discouraging existing firms from charging supracompetitive prices.29 Importantly, because of these price effects, the net
social impact of greater economic competition is positive: increased competition in this local market makes the community, taken as a whole, better off.
In response to this competitive threat, assume that the owner of the
local diner, correctly anticipating that greater competition will negatively
impact the profitability of the business, lobbies local government officials
to prevent this potential competitor from entering the local market. Specifically, to protect his private economic self-interests, the owner of the
diner successfully persuades the local zoning board to reject the entrant’s
28. See generally FISCHEL, supra note 7.
29. See generally Timothy F. Bresnahan & Peter C. Reiss, Entry in Monopoly Markets, 57 REV. ECON. STUD. 531 (1990).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol66/iss4/1

10

Bunting: Curbing the Anticompetitive Impact of Commercial Land Use Regulat

2021]

COMMERCIAL LAND USE REGULATION

691

application for a zoning permit. In support of the diner’s petition to disallow the opening of the fast-food restaurant, the zoning board, however,
does not cite to the protection of specific local business interests as the
rationale for its decision. Instead, the zoning board ties its decision to
other legitimate governmental interests, including the reduction of environmental pollution, traffic congestion, and low-level crime rates. Of
course, these stated rationales are entirely pretextual in this hypothetical:
the decision to disallow market entry is not made to minimize external
social harm. Rather, the decision is the direct result of pressure applied by
an adversely impacted party with whom members of the board may have a
personal relationship. Unlike those seeking to open the national chainstore location, the owner of the diner is a longtime resident of the town,
and members of the board are people whom the owner can be expected
to have known for many years. For this reason, among others, the zoning
board is disinclined to disrupt the status quo and rule against a known
insider in favor of an unknown outsider with no real ties to the local
community.30
Characterized in this manner, the problem posed by commercial land
use regulation is one of public choice: a small number of adversely impacted special interest groups use a political process to prevent market
entry by a potential competitor that threatens existing revenue streams.
Zoning is a mechanism that allows incumbent businesses to maintain or
enlarge monopoly power in a local geographic market. Specifically, incumbents lobby the government to implement specific land use regulations that are solely intended to act as a barrier to market entry, benefiting
existing businesses at the expense of the local community. In both hypotheticals, the zoning board makes the decision not to permit a national,
chain-style fast-food restaurant to open and cites to the same legitimate
government interests in support of its decision to prevent market entry.
On its face, the board’s decision to deny the zoning permit appears an
innocuous exercise of its zoning power: the decision to prevent market
entry is rationally related to the government’s legitimate interests in controlling pollution, traffic congestion, and local crime, as well as more general considerations related to aesthetics and the long-run health of the
local community.31 The social welfare implications of each decision, however, are entirely different. In one case, zoning is used to prevent negative
externalities; in the other, zoning is used to construct a barrier to entry.
Accordingly, the challenge for land use policy is how best to distinguish
these two distinct scenarios and allow zoning actions to proceed only in
the first scenario, not the second, given that the observed justifications for
both zoning actions will appear largely the same if assessed ex post.

30. See infra note 44.
31. See infra Section II.B.2.
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Two Opposing Views of Local Government

One possible response to the challenge suggested above is to contend
that local land use authorities can be safely relied upon to distinguish between efficient and inefficient zoning and will generally only restrict commercial land use if the restriction, on net, increases social welfare. That is
to say, the extent to which the regulation of commercial land use poses a
problem, ultimately, depends upon one’s underlying view of local government. This Subsection briefly describes two competing views of local governmental decision-making: (1) decisions made by local government tend
towards efficiency, and (2) decisions made by local government tend towards inefficiency.
a.

Chicago School of Political Economy

Under the first model of local government, sometimes referred to as
the Chicago School, local land use authorities maximize the joint welfare
of residents and predatory special interest groups who seek to extort
wealth from residents through local land use regulation.32 Regulators of
local land use, such as zoning boards or planning commissions, redistribute income between these two groups such that the marginal costs of enacting regulations that harm residents equals the marginal gain of
enacting regulations that benefit special interests.33 This tradeoff between
marginal costs and marginal benefits may not be linear, however; land use
regulations enacted in response to interest group pressure may create
deadweight losses. In an influential article, Gary Becker argued that these
deadweight losses can serve as a constraint on predation.34 Leveraging a
well-known insight that deadweight losses are proportional to the square
of the tax, Becker argued that a linear increase in takings by a predatory
special interest results in a non-linear increase in deadweight losses and
that these increasing losses, in turn, provoke the victims of inefficient government policies to invest equivalent sums in resisting attempts to appropriate their wealth.35 If the benefits of special interest groups—which
increase linearly—are increasingly offset by the harm to the public—
which increases non-linearly (or parabolically), then government decisionmaking will tend toward efficiency because legislative action is increasingly
32. See, e.g., Samuel Peltzman, Towards a More General Theory of Regulation, 19
J.L. & ECON. 211, 231–39 (1976); see also George Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (contending that groups whose
interests were concentrated would be better able to influence government than
groups whose interests were diffuse and thus the main beneficiaries of regulation
are likely not consumers but regulated firms).
33. See Peltzman, supra note 32, at 231.
34. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 374 (1983); see also Gary Becker, Comment, 19 J.L. &
ECON. 245 (1976).
35. See supra note 34.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol66/iss4/1

12

Bunting: Curbing the Anticompetitive Impact of Commercial Land Use Regulat

2021]

COMMERCIAL LAND USE REGULATION

693

influenced by the preferences of the general public, and not by the particularized demands of special interest groups.36
b.

Virginia School of Political Economy

Under the second model of local government, sometimes referred to
as the Virginia School, local land use authorities implement inefficient
outcomes as a result of the influence of special interest groups who seek to
provide some type of private benefit to government officials (e.g., greater
job security, personal sense of importance, future wealth as a lobbyist) in
exchange for government favors that run contrary to the public good.37
The costs of these inefficient policies are presumed to be diffuse and relatively small at the individual level.38 The anticompetitive harm of restrictive land use regulations, for example, is borne by all consumers and is
unlikely to be large at an individual level. Underlying this view of local
government is the assumption that the public is rationally ignorant of the
lobbying efforts of special interests,39 where the greater the ignorance, the
more easily can special interests obtain private benefits to the detriment of
the public more generally.40 Consumers may not know or be generally
aware, for example, that local firms are charging supra-competitive prices.
Moreover, even if the public did understand and could properly evaluate
the anticompetitive effect of certain zoning restrictions, collective action
on the part of the public to defend such diffuse interests is unlikely, especially given the relatively small magnitude of the effect at the individual
level: the cost to the individual of defeating any one specific government
give-away is large, while the benefit to the individual is relatively small.41
On the other hand, the benefits of inefficient government regulation
are presumed to be concentrated and relatively large at the individual
level. The benefits of commercial land use regulation, for instance, are
enjoyed by a small number of incumbent businesses with a strong incentive to promote anticompetitive policies through lobbying or other forms
of rent-seeking behavior.42 The potential harm caused by market entry to
36. See generally FILIP PALDA, A BETTER KIND OF VIOLENCE: THE CHICAGO
SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, PUBLIC CHOICE, AND THE QUEST FOR AN ULTIMATE
THEORY OF POWER (2015).
37. See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK, THE ECONOMICS OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND
RENT SEEKING (1989); see also MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1965).
38. See, e.g., William C. Mitchell & Michael C. Munger, Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 512 (1991); see also Anne O.
Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291
(1974).
39. See, e.g., David Austen-Smith, Interest Groups, Campaign Contributions, and
Probabilistic Voting, 54 PUB. CHOICE 123, 126–27 (1987).
40. See id.
41. See, e.g., Mitchell & Munger, supra note 38.
42. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First
Amendment, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 912 (1997) (discussing rent-seeking associated
with licensing regime for broadcasting). See generally Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin
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incumbent firms is immediate and obvious, and the financial consequences are significant. Greater competition can be expected to result in
lower revenue, and, in turn, lower profits—and, in some cases, may lead to
the termination of the business. For a relatively small investment, incumbent firms can secure government favors potentially worth much more
and, in fact, may risk forsaking these benefits to existing market competitors if such favors are not actively pursued.43 In this way, the incentive for
concentrated groups to act rationally in their private short-run self-interest, coupled with the intrinsic lack of organization of large groups, can
produce land use regulations that benefit special interest groups at the
expense of the public more broadly.44
This Article regards this second view of local government as largely
correct with respect to the regulation of commercial land use. In certain
cases, land use authorities may fail to correctly assess whether specific restrictions on commercial land use increase social welfare, implementing
restrictive zoning regulations in which the anticompetitive harm is not
fully offset by the corresponding social benefits. In view of this posited
government failure, the discussion to follow examines how the potential
anticompetitive impact of a restrictive zoning action is currently evaluated
Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts, 89 J. POL. ECON. 841
(1981).
43. See, e.g., SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 20 (1978).
44. See, e.g., Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Directly Unproductive, Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities, 90 J. POL. ECON. 988 (1982). The influence of special interest groups can
be further strengthened by local government’s behavioral preference for the status
quo; specifically, regulators of land use may be characterized by a status quo bias,
defined as a preference for the current situation, that pushes them to rule in favor
of incumbent businesses to the detriment of potential market entrants. Status quo
bias has been attributed to a combination of behavioral factors including mere
exposure and loss aversion. As an explanation for the status quo bias, mere exposure posits that existing states (i.e., the status quo) are encountered more frequently than non-existent states (i.e., changes to the status quo) and existing states
will, therefore, generally be perceived as truer and be evaluated more preferably
than non-existent states. Under this theory, status quo bias increases with repeated
exposure over time. See, e.g., Robert F. Bornstein, Exposure and Affect: Overview and
Meta-Analysis of Research, 1968-1987, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 265 (1989). As an explanation for the status quo bias, loss aversion posits that people weigh the potential
losses of switching from the status quo more heavily than the potential gains: the
current baseline (or status quo) is taken as a reference point, and any change from
that baseline is perceived as a loss: even though choosing the status quo may entail
forfeiting certain positive consequences, when these consequences are represented as forfeited “gains,” they are given less weight psychologically than the
“losses” that would be incurred if the status quo were changed. See, e.g., Nick Bostrom & Toby Ord, The Reversal Test: Eliminating Status Quo Bias in Applied Ethics, 116
ETHICS 656 (2006). This tendency to overemphasize the avoidance of losses favors
retaining the status quo, resulting in a status quo bias in which change is avoided,
and decision-makers tend to stick with what has been done in the past. See, e.g.,
William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988) (explaining how departures from the status quo occur only if the benefits of the change outweigh the risks by a sufficiently large
amount).
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and explores whether land use policy may be usefully modified to produce
a more optimal weighing of the expected social costs and benefits of restrictive zoning.
II. CURRENT REGULATORY APPROACHES
Part II explores how the anticompetitive impact of a zoning ordinance is assessed under current law. Two avenues of attack are generally
available to challenge the validity of a zoning ordinance. The first avenue
of attack is antitrust laws. Under this approach, the challenger argues that
the zoning restriction harms economic competition in violation of federal
or state antitrust laws.45 The second avenue of attack is substantive due
process. Under this approach, the challenger argues that the zoning restriction is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
Neither attack is likely to succeed, however. In general, antitrust law exempts a local government from antitrust liability if the governing body
exercises its legislative powers to enact a regulation with anticompetitive
impact, meaning that a zoning ordinance cannot be challenged under antitrust laws.46 Likewise, although courts have recognized that zoning
should not be used to regulate economic competition among private businesses, judicial scrutiny of the potential anticompetitive impact of a zoning
action under rational basis review is weak and can be easily circumvented
by local governments.47 Rather than engage in the complicated balancing
of social costs and benefits necessary to determine if a zoning action, on
net, increases social welfare, courts have been willing to assess anticompetitive impact generally only when this balancing is relatively straightforward and have been otherwise content to rely upon the legislature to
regulate commercial land use in a socially efficient manner.48 Whether
this reliance is sound, of course, depends, in large part, upon the extent to
which the regulation of commercial land use by local government tends
toward efficiency.
A.

Antitrust Attack

This Section examines how the anticompetitive impact of a restrictive
zoning action is presently evaluated under the federal antitrust laws.
45. See e.g., City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., 499 U.S. 365, 367
(1991) (referring to allegations that a zoning ordinance provided an unfair competitive advantage to an advertising company that controlled more than ninety-five
percent of the local market and enjoyed close relations with city officials).
46. See infra Section II.A.
47. See infra Section II.B.2.
48. For an illustration of this tendency in antitrust-zoning jurisprudence, see
Section II.B.2.a.
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Immunity Flows from States

Whether a local government is liable for a violation of the federal
antitrust laws depends, in large part, upon whether a local government
qualifies for immunity under the state action doctrine. Originating in the
1943 Supreme Court case Parker v. Brown,49 the state action doctrine insulates state actors from federal antitrust claims.50 The doctrine respects the
sovereign immunity afforded to the states under a federal system in which
the states, and not Congress, are entitled to regulate matters within their
geographic boundaries unless Congress has plainly indicated a contrary
result.51 Unlike state governments, local governments are not themselves
sovereign entities.52 Accordingly, local governments “do not receive all
the federal deference of the States that create them[,]” and are only immune to the extent that they act with authority from the state.53 Specifically, a local government’s immunity from antitrust liability is conditioned
on authorization from the state to displace competition. Although the
Supreme Court initially appeared to suggest that a high level of state oversight was required for antitrust immunity to attach,54 the Court has, over
time, generally set a low bar as to what constitutes sufficient authorization,55 expressly articulating this standard in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising,56 which clarifies how the state action doctrine applies to
local governments.57
a.

State Action Doctrine Applicable to Municipalities

In Omni, the Supreme Court significantly strengthened the antitrust
immunity afforded local governments in land use cases with its broad in49. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
50. See id. at 352.
51. See, e.g., S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48,
56–57 (1985).
52. See City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412 (1978)
(first citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 n.12 (1974); then citing Lincoln
County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890)) (“Cities are not themselves sovereign[.]”).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975) (suggesting
that the state must compel and, in fact, supervise a municipality’s conduct); City of
Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410 (holding that immunity is limited to instances where a
municipality acts according to a “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed”
state policy to displace competition); cf. Cmty Commc’n Co. v. City of Boulder, 455
U.S. 40, 55 (1982) (refusing to find a “clear articulation and affirmative expression” where the “State’s position is one of mere neutrality respecting the municipal
actions challenged as anticompetitive”).
55. See, e.g., City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415 (holding that the state need not
supervise, mandate, or even explicitly authorize local government’s anticompetitive behavior so long as the state “ ‘contemplated the kind of action complained
of’ ”(quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434
(1976))).
56. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
57. See id. at 379–80; see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ticor Title, 504 U.S. 621
(1992) (clarifying how state action doctrine applies to private parties).
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terpretation of the state action doctrine. First, the Court held that the
proper focus of the state action analysis is limited to whether the state, in
fact, authorized the challenged conduct by the local government: determining if a local government exceeds the limits of that authority is not
relevant to the analysis.58 Second, the Court eliminated the co-conspirator
exception to state action immunity.59
Omni involved a challenge to a zoning ordinance that restricted the
size, location, and spacing of billboards.60 Omni Outdoor Advertising alleged that the zoning ordinance provided an unfair competitive advantage
to the Columbia Outdoor Advertising (“COA”) company, which controlled more than ninety-five percent of the local market and enjoyed
close relations with city officials.61 Omni alleged that COA had conspired
with city officials to prevent business competitors from entering the market.62 On the question of the state action doctrine, the Court held that
the City of Columbia was entitled to immunity from antitrust liability. The
state had expressly granted the city statutory authority “to regulate the
size, location, and spacing of billboards.”63 The Court rejected the contention that this requirement can be met only if the delegating statute
explicitly permits the displacement of competition, holding that it is
enough if suppression of competition is the “foreseeable result” of what
the statute authorizes.64 Because the purpose of zoning regulation is to
displace unfettered business freedom in a manner that regularly has the
effect of preventing normal acts of economic competition, especially with
respect to market entry, the Court concluded that the foreseeability condition was “amply met” in the present case.65
This interpretation of the state action doctrine implies broad immunity for local governments to enact zoning regulations with significant anticompetitive impact. The authority of local governments to regulate
commercial land use is expressly delegated to local governments by state
governments through state zoning enabling statutes.66 If it is “foreseeable” that an exercise of such zoning power would displace competition,
58. See Omni, 499 U.S. at 372.
59. See id. at 374.
60. Id. at 368.
61. Id. at 367 (“The mayor and other members of the city council were personal friends of COA’s majority owner, and the company and its officers occasionally contributed funds and free billboard space to their campaigns.”).
62. Id. at 369 (“According to respondent . . . these beneficences were part of a
longstanding secret anticompetitive agreement whereby the City and COA would
each use their [sic] respective power and resources to protect . . . COA’s monopoly
position, in return for which City Council members received advantages made possible by COA’s monopoly.” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
63. Id. at 370–71.
64. Id. at 373 (citing Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 41 (1985)).
65. Id.
66. See infra Section II.B.1.
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as the Supreme Court acknowledged in Omni in holding that zoning is
inherently anticompetitive,67 then the state, in delegating such power to
local governments under the enabling legislation, has clearly articulated a
policy authorizing anticompetitive conduct that serves to shield the exercise of zoning power by local governments from antitrust attack. In other
words, any common form of zoning that limits market entry is entitled to
state action immunity.
b.

Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984

Congress enacted the Local Government Antitrust Act of 198468 that
barred antitrust damages against official state actors.69 The Act codified
the judicially-created state action doctrine, immunizing from monetary liability “any official action directed by a local government, or official or employee thereof acting in an official capacity.”70 The legislative history
indicates that Congress intended the state action doctrine to apply, by
analogy, to the conduct of a local government in directing the actions of
non-governmental parties, as if the local government were a state.71 A
local government’s activities, therefore, need not be authorized by the
state for immunity to apply. Accordingly, local governments are more
likely to qualify for antitrust immunity under the Act than under the state
action doctrine itself.72
This provision for injunctive relief, however, has not, in practice, significantly expanded local governments’ liability for anticompetitive conduct in connection with the regulation of commercial land use.73 In many
cases, state action immunity bars suit altogether, foreclosing the possibility
of any remedy under the Act.74 Moreover, when courts have acknowl67. See Omni, 499 U.S. at 373 (“The very purpose of zoning regulation is to
displace unfettered business freedom in a manner that regularly has the effect of
preventing normal acts of competition, particularly on the part of new entrants.”).
68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 34–36 (1994).
69. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 98–593, at 3 (1984) (stating that legislation was necessary to “allow local governments to go about their daily functions without the paralyzing fear of antitrust lawsuits”).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 34.
71. See H.R. REP. NO. 98–1158, at 3 (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4602, 4626–27.
72. See E. Thomas Sullivan, Antitrust Regulation of Land Use: Federalism’s Triumph over Competition, The Last Fifty Years, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 473, 509 (2000).
Unlike the absolute immunity provided under the state action doctrine, immunity
under the Act is only from monetary damages: a plaintiff may still request injunctive relief. See 15 U.S.C. § 36(a). Importantly, in recognizing the possibility of injunctive relief, Congress confirmed, for the first time, that local governments come
within the jurisdiction of federal antitrust laws. See id. § 34.
73. See Sullivan, supra note 72, at 510.
74. State action immunity trumps the protection afforded by the Act. If there
is overlap, then the state action doctrine precludes both damage and injunctive
suits. See, e.g., Am. Int’l Sec. Specialists, Inc. v. Roberts, 161 F.3d 1, 3 n.1 (4th Cir.
1998) (concluding that appellees were entitled to immunity under state action,
which rendered it unnecessary to consider whether they might also be immune
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edged the possibility of injunctive relief, the formidable defenses available
to government defendants, coupled with the burden of properly stating a
claim for equitable relief, have typically proven an insurmountable obstacle to antitrust plaintiffs seeking an equitable remedy.75 The legislative
history indicates that Congress sought to “readjust the litigation advantages and disadvantages more equitably for local government defendants”76 in requiring that plaintiff’s burden in bringing a claim for
injunctive relief be treated the same as in other equitable actions.77 In a
suit for equitable relief, the remedial focus is on prevention of future injury, and not compensation for prior injury.78 The prospective nature of
equitable remedies imposes a substantial burden on the plaintiff at the
outset of the litigation, because “[l]ogically, ‘a prospective remedy will
provide no relief for an injury that is, and likely will remain, entirely in the
past.’”79
2.

Co-Conspirator Exception

Private parties often play an important role in the regulation of local
land use. As such, private parties may be implicated when such regulations yield anticompetitive outcomes including the exclusion of a business
competitor. In Omni, the Supreme Court expressly rejected a co-conspirator exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine under which private parties
may be subject to antitrust liability for attempts to influence government
officials if such parties could be characterized as conspiring with local government officials to stifle economic competition in a local market.80
a.

Noerr-Pennington Doctrine

The Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunizes private parties from antitrust liability for attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws
or regulations,81 even if such political actions are purely motivated by an
under the Local Government Antitrust Act); Martin v. Memorial Hosp., 86 F.3d
1391, 1398–1400 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that appellants were immune under the
state action doctrine and reversing the lower court’s conclusion that injunctive
relief, attorney’s fees, and court costs were available under the Act).
75. See Sullivan, supra note 72, at 487.
76. H.R. REP. NO. 98–965, at 18–19 (1984).
77. See S. REP. NO. 98–593, at 6 (1984); H.R. REP. NO. 98–965, at 18–19.
78. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65.
79. Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Am. Postal Workers Union v. Frank, 968 F.2d 1373, 1376 (1st Cir. 1992)).
80. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., 499 U.S. 365, 382 (1991).
81. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) (“Joint
efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though
intended to eliminate competition.”); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961) (finding that antitrust laws are directed only
to private trade restraints, not conduct undertaken because of valid government
action); see also Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972)
(expanding upon the Noerr-Pennington doctrine).
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anticompetitive purpose.82 The doctrine is premised on the notion that
the activities of those who petition local governments for changes to certain laws or regulations constitute protected free speech under the First
Amendment,83 and upon a recognition that the antitrust laws, “tailored as
they are for the business world, are not at all appropriate for application
in the political arena.”84 Prior to Omni, several lower courts had recognized an exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, refusing to grant immunity if local government officials had conspired with private parties to
stifle market competition.85 Conspiratorial activity between a local government and members of its constituency was deemed to lie outside the
scope of constitutionally-protected free speech.86 Specifically, these courts
located a basis for this co-conspirator exception in Parker which appeared
to suggest that immunity would not attach if a state or local government
participated in a private agreement to restrain trade.87
In Omni, the Supreme Court expressly rejected this analysis, holding
that Parker “simply clar[ified] that [state action] immunity does not necessarily obtain where the State acts not in a regulatory capacity but as a commercial participant in a given market.”88 In the Court’s view, a conspiracy
exception would, in effect, nullify state action immunity because good government necessarily requires agreements between public officials and
members of their constituency.89 Drawing a parallel to the state action
doctrine, the Court reasoned that both the state action and Noerr-Pennington doctrines “are complementary expressions of the principle that
the antitrust laws regulate business, not politics[,]” and concluded that it
would be logically incongruous to bar the conspiracy exception from one
82. See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670 (“Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a
concerted effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose.”).
83. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138 (Because “[t]he right of petition is one of the
freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights . . . we cannot, of course, lightly impute to
Congress an intent to invade these freedoms”). See generally E. Thomas Sullivan,
First Amendment Defenses in Antitrust Litigation, 46 MO. L. REV. 517, 538–39 (1981).
84. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 141.
85. See, e.g., Omni Outdoor Advert. v. Columbia Outdoor Advert., 891 F.2d
1127 (4th Cir. 1989); Westborough Mall v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733
(8th Cir. 1982); Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977).
86. See, e.g., Whitworth, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977).
87. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351–52 (“[W]e have no question of the
state or its municipality becoming a participant in a private agreement or combination by others for restraint of trade . . . . The state in adopting and enforcing the
prorate program made no contract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy
in restraint of trade or to establish monopoly but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit.” (first citing Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941); then
citing Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1904))).
88. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., 499 U.S. 365, 374–75 (1991).
89. See id. at 375 (stating that a conspiracy exception would make “all anticompetitive regulation . . . vulnerable to a ‘conspiracy’ charge”).
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but not the other.90 Moreover, even if unlawful conduct is a factor in such
an exchange, the Court believed that other laws, like the Hobbs Act, for
example, are better suited to regulate such private conduct.91
b.

Sham Exception

Several exceptions do exist to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, including
the “sham” exception, which holds that using the petitioning process simply as an anticompetitive weapon without legitimately seeking a positive
outcome to the petitioning destroys immunity.92 In Omni, the Supreme
Court further strengthened the immunity available to local governments
in holding that this sham exception did not apply to “improper or even
unlawful” lobbying efforts to obtain zoning restrictions when “the regulatory process is being invoked genuinely[.]”93 The Court explained that
“the purpose of delaying a competitor’s entry into the market does not
render lobbying activity a ‘sham,’ unless . . . the delay is sought to be
achieved only by the lobbying process itself, and not by the governmental
action that the lobbying seeks.”94 A sham proceeding is defined not by
anticompetitive purpose, but, rather, by the absence of any purpose to
obtain government action.95 Thus, initiating an administrative proceeding that, if successful, will harm a business competitor falls within the
scope of the Noerr–Pennington doctrine, whereas initiating a similar proceeding with no expectation of success solely to prevent market entry by a
business competitor falls squarely within the sham exception.96
90. Id. at 383. In effect, a conspiracy exception would bar First Amendment
protection whenever a private party was successful in petitioning a local government to a particular outcome. See id. at 375.
91. See id. at 378–79 (suggesting the Hobbs Act as one example of a law better
suited to deal with illegal petitioning activity).
92. See id. at 374–75; see also E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961) (holding that activity constituting “a mere sham
to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with
the business relationships of a competitor” is not protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine).
93. Omni, 499 U.S. at 381–82.
94. Id. at 381.
95. See id.
96. See, e.g., Miracle Mile Assocs. v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir.
1980) (“[A]ccess-barring is the cornerstone to the sham exception.” (quoting
Wilmorite, Inc. v. Eagen Real Estate Inc, 454 F. Supp 1124, 1134–35 (N.D.N.Y.
1977))). Two years after Omni, in Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Industries, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of “intent” for purposes of
the sham exception, rejecting a purely subjective definition of a sham lawsuit.
Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49 (1993). Under
the first prong of its two-part test to determine the existence of sham litigation, a
lawsuit fits within the sham exception only if the suit is “objectively baseless in the
sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.”
Id. at 60. If the challenged litigation satisfies the first prong, then the Court proceeds to the second prong under which it must determine whether the litigant’s
subjective motivation in filing the lawsuit was “an attempt to interfere directly with
the business relationships of a competitor . . . through the use [of] the governmen-
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Due Process Attack

This Section examines how the potential anticompetitive impact of a
restrictive zoning action is currently evaluated under the Due Process
Clause.97
1.

Zoning Power

This Subsection provides a general overview of zoning law and delegated authority and explores the difference between a zoning ordinance
and a general police ordinance.
a.

Zoning Law and Authority

“Zoning is the deprivation, for the public good, of certain uses by
owners of property to which their property might otherwise be put . . . .”98
A zoning ordinance is a legislative document drafted and enacted by a
local government and is generally enforced by a specialized board or planning commission.99 Through zoning ordinances, local governments set
forth classifications of permitted or prohibited land uses, typically dividing
the locality into separate districts within which only certain prescribed
land uses are allowed.100 Land use restrictions vary across localities according to the different legislative decisions that each local legislative body
makes when drafting or amending its zoning laws or regulations.101 Although zoning decisions are made with respect to specific neighborhoods
and the property owners located within, zoning decisions are considered
legislative in nature, impacting the community at large, and require a holistic analysis of aesthetic, environmental, and economic considerations.102
The legal basis for all land use regulation is the police power.103 The
police power is the inherent authority of a state government to impose
restrictions on private rights in the interests of public health, safety,
morals, and general welfare.104 To achieve these public benefits, the state
retains the power to constrain (within federal and state constitutional limtal process—as opposed to the outcome of that process[.]” Id. at 60–61 (citation
omitted) (internal quotations omitted). If so, then the proceeding is deemed a
sham, and the litigant’s activities are not entitled to immunity from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See id.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . . ”).
98. Gilgert v. Stockton Port Dist., 60 P.2d 847, 850 (Cal. 1936).
99. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65850 (West 2000).
100. See, e.g., John R. Nolon, Historical Overview of the American Land Use System:
A Diagnostic Approach to Evaluating Governmental Land Use Control, 23 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 821, 831–33 (2006).
101. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Cambridge City Council, 779 N.E.2d
141, 149–50 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
102. See, e.g., Metro. Baptist Church v. D.C. Dep’t of Consumer & Regulatory
Affairs, 718 A.2d 119, 125 (D.C. 1998).
103. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31–32 (1954).
104. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
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its) private and economic interests, including private property rights. The
police power is an inherent authority of state governments; importantly,
local governments do not have an inherent authority to regulate land use.
Instead, this authority is delegated to local governments by state governments through state zoning enabling statutes,105 or home-rule provisions
contained in the state constitution.106 Accordingly, for a zoning ordinance to be valid, the enactment of the ordinance must represent a legitimate exercise of the zoning power expressly delegated to a local
government by the state.107
Courts have held that a zoning action represents a valid exercise of its
delegated zoning power if such action bears a rational relationship to a
legitimate government interest108 and is not otherwise arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support.109 This statement of what
is commonly referred to as “rational basis review” suggests the following
two-step test. The first step is to identify a legitimate government interest
that justifies the zoning ordinance—not all government interests are legitimate.110 Having successfully identified a legitimate government interest,
the second step is to consider whether the zoning ordinance is rationally
related to the stated government interest and does not constitute arbitrary
105. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.3201 (West 2016).
106. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, ¶ IV; see also CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (“A
county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and
other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.”). Zoning and
land use regulation based upon delegated police power is distinct from the government’s taking of private property through its inherent power of eminent domain—
when government restrict private property rights under the authority of the zoning
power, a private property owner is not typically entitled to just compensation. See,
e.g., William B. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1057, 1059–61 (1980) (discussing how police power is “very different” from
eminent domain).
107. See Euclid v. Amber Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 389–90, 395 (1926) (holding
that the exercise of the zoning power is constitutionally valid, unless such provisions “are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare” (first citing Thomas Cusack Co. v.
City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 530–31 (1917); then citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30-31 (1905))).
108. See Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473
(Cal. 1976).
109. See, e.g., Hernandez v. City of Hanford, 159 P.3d 33, 44 (Cal. 2007) (stating that “zoning ordinances, when reasonable in object and not arbitrary in operation, constitute a justifiable exercise of police power” (quoting Lockard v. City of
Los Angeles, 202 P.2d 38, 42 (Cal. 1949))); see also Town of Normal v. Seven Kegs,
599 N.E.2d 1384, 1387 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (stating that local government action
must bear “a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose and is
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory” (citing Kidd v. Indus. Comm’n, 426 N.E.2d
822, 824 (Ill. 1981))).
110. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (“The concept of the public
welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.”(citation omitted)).
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or capricious action by the local government.111 In exercising their zoning power, local governments are given broad discretion in determining
what actions are reasonable to protect the public health, safety, morals,
and general welfare of the local community.112 In general, local governments are permitted, within constitutional limits, to use zoning power to
regulate or restrict private property including land uses, population densities, the height of buildings, and the location of a building on a lot (i.e.,
setbacks).113
b.

Zoning Power Versus Police Power

There are important differences between a zoning ordinance and a
general police ordinance adopted under the general police power authority delegated to a local government by the state.114 Specifically, a local
government’s zoning power can be viewed as a “subset of the police
power,”115 under which the government’s power to act is subject to relatively greater restrictions. Distinguishing a zoning ordinance from a nonzoning police ordinance “is not necessarily a simple task.”116 In general, a
zoning ordinance regulates the use of land, whereas a police ordinance
regulates an “activity” performed upon that land.117
Unlike a police ordinance, the administrative process to enact a zoning ordinance includes, in recognition of the central role that private
property rights play in a free-market capitalist system, a number of procedural requirements, such as public hearings, notices, appeals, and nonconforming uses.118 Further, the master plan itself, upon which most
111. See infra Section II.B.2.b.
112. See, e.g., Carlin v. City of Palm Springs, 92 Cal. Rptr. 535, 539 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1971). See generally Jeffrey D. Jackson, Putting Rationality Back into the Rational
Basis Test: Saving Substantive Due Process and Redeeming the Promise of the Ninth Amendment, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 491 (2011).
113. See Euclid v. Amber Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 388–89 (1926).
114. See Brian W. Ohm, Some Modern Day Musings on the Police Power, 47 URB.
LAW. 625, 648–56 (2015).
115. Zwiefelhofer v. Town of Cooks Valley, 809 N.W.2d 362, 370 (Wis. 2012).
116. Id.
117. See id. (identifying six common characteristics of a traditional zoning ordinance, including that a zoning ordinance traditionally controls where an activity
takes place spatially rather than how such activity must be conducted). The Tennessee Supreme Court has adopted a test under which a court must first assess the
non-zoning ordinance to determine if the ordinance is so closely related to the
zoning ordinance that it is “tantamount to zoning;” only after a court has determined that the non-zoning ordinance is tantamount to zoning does the court determine if the ordinance substantially impacts the use of the property. See SNPCO,
Inc. v. City of Jefferson City, 363 S.W.3d 467, 478 (Tenn. 2012) (holding that ordinance banning the sale or fireworks within a city is not a zoning ordinance).
Courts have recognized that “use of land” and “activities” of persons or business
entities are neither absolute nor mutually exclusive as legal categorizations. See,
e.g., Belanger v. Chesterfield Twp., 293 N.W.2d 622, 623 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
118. See ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN
185–224 (1987).
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zoning ordinances are typically based, must be adopted pursuant to the
procedures set forth in the state enabling legislation which also generally
include public involvement, hearings, notices, and appeals.119 Given
these greater procedural burdens, a local government should, in theory,
prefer to employ its relatively less restricted police powers to enact a general police ordinance with anticompetitive purpose. Rather than attempt
to “zone” a given business out of the jurisdiction, a local government can
simply use its general police powers to enact a ban prohibiting the unwanted business activity.120 Despite the formal procedural requirement, a
local government may, nevertheless, prefer to employ its zoning power,
rather than its more general police powers, to achieve an anticompetitive
purpose for reasons related to (1) transparency, (2) electoral accountability, and (3) non-retroactive application of the law.
i.

Transparency

Compared to a general police ordinance, the anticompetitive impact
of a zoning ordinance tends to be relatively more difficult for the voting
public to assess insofar as the exact properties impacted by the zoning
restriction are often unclear and change dynamically over time. Consider,
for example, zoning restrictions on medical marijuana dispensaries in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In 2016, Pennsylvania voted to legalize medical marijuana. The legislation prohibited medical marijuana dispensaries
from locating “within 500 feet of residential areas, churches, hotels, convention centers, playgrounds, pools, parks, recreation centers, libraries,
and other places.”121 The net effect of this type of zoning restriction is
not immediately clear on its face and requires a fair measure of technical
analysis to determine the areas of permitted land use.
Moreover, as these listed structures enter or exit the market, the areas
of prohibited land use change and must be recalculated accordingly, further complicating the analysis required to assess the expected impact of
the zoning action. Indeed, as evidence of just how difficult it can be to
119. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 125.3801–85 (2008).
120. In general, a complete ban is properly characterized as an exercise of the
local government’s general police power, and not as a zoning action and, therefore, will be free of the accompanying procedural requirements. See, e.g., SNPCO,
363 S.W.3d at 478 (holding that ordinance banning the sale of fireworks within the
city is not a zoning ordinance).
121. Tricia L. Nadolny & Sam Wood, Before Launch of Medical Marijuana, City
Council to Weigh Where Dispensaries Can Open, PHILA. INQUIRER (Oct. 20, 2016),
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/20161021_Before_launch_of_medical_
marijuana__City_Council_to_weigh_where_dispensaries_can_open.html [https://
perma.cc/AKN6-G2LA]. In addition, many municipalities have enacted zoning
provisions to prevent “green zones,” which forbid any cannabis dispensary from
opening within a set distance (often 1,000 feet) from another dispensary. See, e.g.,
Dan Adams, Here’s Where Marijuana Businesses Can Set Up Shop in Boston Under New
Zoning Rules, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 11, 2018) https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/
2018/04/11/boston-approves-zoning-for-recreational-marijuana-businesses/iOds
PhiqViSaaEqnrEIy9L/story.html [https://perma.cc/73XM-8TWM].
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assess the true impact of land use regulation, a growing industry of private,
for-profit companies has developed solely to help cannabis dispensaries
navigate land use obstacles. As part of its services, these companies provide detailed maps that display where a dispensary can legally locate in a
given jurisdiction under existing land use regulations.122 A local government may be able to exploit this lack of transparency to shield the anticompetitive impact of commercial land use regulations from voters who
cannot properly identify or assess the true extent to which a lack of consumer choice is the result of natural free market forces or the product of
restrictive land use regulations enacted with deliberate anticompetitive
purpose.123
Not only can local governments use zoning to obscure the true impact of a government action from voters, but they can also use this relative
lack of transparency to evade the preemptive effect of state law. In White
Mountain Health Center v. Maricopa County,124 for instance, the Maricopa
County ordinance at issue allowed medical cannabis cultivation and other
medical cannabis operations in a single industrial zone.125 This ordinance, however, imposed the additional zoning restriction—the “poison
pill provision”—that no land use within that zone can be in conflict with
federal, state, or local law.126 Because cannabis cultivation and possession
is a violation of federal law, the zoning ordinance thus operated as an
effective ban on all cannabis-related operations in the county.127 The Arizona Appellate Court characterized the issue in the case as whether a local
government can ban medical cannabis operations under the guise of “reasonable zoning.”128 Although the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act
(“AMMA”) expressly permitted local regulation of medical cannabis operations through zoning ordinances, the effective ban imposed by the
county was found to “nullify the basis for AMMA, [which was] to permit
use of marijuana for medical purposes consistent with the AMMA . . . .”129
122. See, e.g., Cannabis Real Estate Consultants, Custom Cannabis Regulation &
Property Maps, CREC (Mar. 1, 2021), https://cannabisrealestateconsultants.com/
custom-regulation-maps/ [https://perma.cc/5HCG-8K7P].
123. Additionally, a zoning action sends an intrinsically mixed signal to the
electorate insofar as an activity is deemed lawful by the local government on the
one hand, but the locations where such activity can take place are subsequently
restricted through zoning on the other hand—in some cases to such an extent that
the activity is, in effect, banned in the jurisdiction. Having voted to make an activity lawful (e.g., the use of medical marijuana), the electorate may very well reasonably believe that they are now free to engage in that activity and may not fully
understand the extent to which this activity is, in fact, restricted by a complex set of
zoning and planning processes about which they know little and in which they are
relatively uninvolved.
124. 386 P.3d 416 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
125. Id. at 420.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 435.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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The appellate court concluded that the poison pill provision in the
county’s ordinance violated state law and was, therefore, invalid.130
ii. Electoral Accountability
Most localities require some form of governmental decision on a caseby-case basis in connection with the placement of certain land uses, delegating to nonelected administrative bodies the discretion to make important zoning decisions in individual cases, including, most notably,
variances and special use permits.131 Governed by standards in the zoning
ordinance itself, an administrative body is granted the discretion to determine if certain land uses fit within specific exceptions to the zoning ordinance or should receive a zoning variance and be allowed to use property
in a manner not otherwise permitted under the current zoning ordinance.132 These individual administrative determinations can have significant anticompetitive impact insofar as such determinations prevent
market entry by potential competitors. Compared to legislative bodies,
however, administrative decision-making of this kind is not constrained by
the same measure of electoral accountability.
Under one view of the administrative state, this loss of accountability
to the electorate is compensated by the institutional expertise of members
of the administrative body that allows for better, more fully informed decisions. The basic concept that an administrative agency acts as an expert,
providing neutral, technical expertise to resolve complex specialized
socio-political challenges, is often viewed as one of the cornerstones of the
administrative process in the United States.133 In the case of land use regulation, however, the lack of electoral accountability may not be offset by
the usual professional expertise typically associated with administrative decision-making. Most members of administrative bodies connected to the
regulation of land use—planning commissions or boards of appeals—do
not necessarily possess a comparative expertise in land use planning, let
alone antitrust law.134 Although some members of these bodies will certainly have substantial expertise in land use matters, unlike other administrative bodies, members are not specifically chosen because they possess
special knowledge or training in land use planning (or antitrust law specifically).135 As a result, these administrative bodies often have no greater
130. Id. at 437.
131. See, e.g., Jerry L. Anderson et al., A Study of American Zoning Board Composition and Public Attitudes Toward Zoning Issues, 40 URB. LAW. 689, 696 (2008).
132. See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker, Delegation of Power and Function in Zoning
Administration, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 60 (1963).
133. See, e.g., David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO L.J. 97, 135-37 (2000) (“[T]here is little that could be done to
provide Congress with the engineering expertise of OSHA or EPA.”).
134. See AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, AMENDING THE ZONING ORDINANCE (Oct. 1958).
135. See id.
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competence than elected representatives to assess the net social welfare
impact of commercial land use regulation.136 Accordingly, when land use
decisions are made by these administrative bodies, the loss of direct accountability to the electorate can come with no significant improvement
in decision-making quality: business owners relinquish the ability to push
back directly against a zoning action with anticompetitive impact through
the political process without receiving the benefit of more expert decisionmaking in exchange.137
iii. Non-Retroactive Application of Zoning Laws
Finally, unlike a police ordinance, a zoning ordinance tends to be
forward looking, regulating future uses of land or property rather than
existing ones and typically do not apply retroactively to current land
users.138 Existing land uses must be allowed to continue and are called
“nonconforming” uses, buildings, or parcels.139 Zoning ordinances allow
certain property owners whose land use was legal prior to the adoption of
a zoning ordinance to maintain that land use despite nonconformance
with recently adopted zoning regulations, a practice motivated by important constitutional considerations.140 Police ordinances, however, are
generally applied retroactively and tend to cover all market participants
with equal force, including incumbent businesses. If a local government,
for example, has prohibited an activity under its general police powers,
then all existing businesses can be forced to comply with the regulation,
not just market entrants.141 Compared to land use, the same level of protection is generally not afforded business activity, because a business
owner can generally alter an existing activity at lower cost than an existing
land use. A business activity, for instance, might be curtailed at no cost to
136. See id.
137. Although this Article is concerned with land use regulation that is legislative in nature insofar as the government action impacts entire jurisdiction, zoning
actions that are site-specific may be better characterized as quasi-judicial and thus
receive more stringent standard of review. See, e.g., Samuel Toevs Creason, Land
Use and the Lost Promise of Cooper: What Happened to the Judicial in Quasi-Judicial Proceedings, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 735, 745–55 (2008).
138. See Zwiefelhofer v. Town of Cooks Valley, 809 N.W.2d 362, 377 (Wis.
2012) (acknowledging that the Town’s ordinance “grandfathers” existing mines
and stating there is no rule, however, that prohibits a non-zoning police power
ordinance from exempting preexisting uses).
139. See, e.g., Rhod-A-Zalea v. Snohomish Cty., 959 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Wash.
1998) (“[N]onconforming uses are allowed to continue based on the belief that it
would be unfair and perhaps unconstitutional to require an immediate cessation
of a nonconforming use.” (citing State ex rel. Miller v. Cain, 242 P.2d 505, 506
(Wash. 1952))).
140. See County of Columbia v. Bylewski, 288 N.W.2d 129, 138 (Wis. 1980)
(describing the protection granted to preexisting, “non-conforming” uses); see also
4 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING, § 72:2
(2011) (describing the “doctrine of vested nonconforming uses”).
141. See, e.g., SNPCO, Inc. v. City of Jefferson City, 363 S.W.3d 467, 478–79
(Tenn. 2012).
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the business owner (other than perhaps lost inventory), whereas compliance with a new zoning ordinance may require the property owner to invest considerable resources in making costly physical alterations to land or
an existing structure.142
While the forward-looking nature of zoning protects existing interests
in private property, the non-retroactive application of zoning law can also
serve as a barrier to entry, shielding incumbent businesses from zoning
regulations that increase business expenses or reduce business revenue.
Indeed, the non-retroactive nature of zoning is arguably the principal
source of anticompetitive impact in Omni. In that case, after the respondent entered the billboard market, the city of Columbia passed a new ordinance restricting the size, location, and spacing of billboards.143
Importantly, these restrictions, particularly those on spacing, provided Columbia Outdoor Advertising (“COA”), which already had its billboards in
place,144 with a competitive advantage, because these restrictions did not
apply retroactively to COA and applied only, in a forward-looking manner,
to those who had yet to enter the local market, including Omni.145 Had
the zoning restrictions applied equally to incumbents and potential market entrants alike, the zoning ordinance would not have had the same
level of anticompetitive impact. By not applying retroactively to incumbent business, restrictive zoning ordinances, almost by definition, impose
differential costs on market competitors that can serve as barriers to entry,
reducing competition in the local market to the detriment of local consumers. A local government, by contrast, may not be able to draw such
distinctions under its general police powers, potentially running afoul of
the Equal Protection Clause were it to treat similarly situated business differently in this manner.146 For this reason, among the others highlighted
above, a local government may prefer to exercise its zoning power rather
than its more general police power to favor incumbent businesses at the
expense of potential market entrants.
While commentators have argued that the exercise of legislative authority by local governments should not receive immunity from antitrust
142. See David A. Dana, Natural Preservation and the Race to Develop, 143 U. PA.
L. REV. 655, 685 (1995) (“The costs of undoing an existing development, moreover, are typically much greater than the costs of preventing development.”); cf. Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 796 (2005) (“Concern
about wasting valuable resources is, by far, the most commonly voiced justification
for restricting an owner’s ability to destroy her property.”). See generally Osborne
M. Reynolds, Jr., Self-Induced Hardship in Zoning Variances: Does a Purchaser Have No
One but Himself to Blame?, 20 URB. LAW. 1 (1988).
143. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., 499 U.S. 365, 368 (1991).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985) (stating that the Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction that all
persons similarly situated should be treated alike”).
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liability in all cases,147 the principal claim advanced here is relatively more
limited in scope: a zoning ordinance should not receive the same level of
deference with respect to possible anticompetitive impact as a general police ordinance.148 Not only can a local government more easily frustrate
competition in a local market through the exercise of its zoning power (as
opposed to its more general police power), but unlike a general police
ordinance, a zoning ordinance will, in almost all cases, have some nontrivial anticompetitive impact, especially in the case of commercial land
use regulation.
2.

Judicial Checks on Anticompetitive Impact of Zoning

Like the protection of private property rights, well-functioning local
markets are critical to the success of a capitalist, free market economy.
Yet, measured against private property rights, the same procedural safeguards do not exist, in comparable force, to protect economic competition from the anticompetitive impact of commercial zoning regulations.
Although courts, as a general matter, do recognize that zoning should not
be used to regulate economic competition among private businesses, judicial scrutiny of the potential anticompetitive impact of commercial land
use regulation tends to be weak and can be easily circumvented by local
governments. Arguably, the relatively lax judicial review of zoning actions
reveals an understandable reluctance on the part of the judiciary to engage in a complex weighing of the potential anticompetitive effects of a
restrictive zoning action against the negative externalities that are eliminated by such legislative action.
a.

Legitimate State Interest

The case of Hernandez v. City of Hanford149 illustrates well how courts
tend to assess the anticompetitive impact of a zoning action under rational
basis review.150 In this case, the California Supreme Court concluded that
because all zoning has some impact on economic competition, anticompetitive impact alone cannot invalidate a zoning ordinance, stating, in partic147. See Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Remarks at the Fordham Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law & Policy (Oct. 24, 2003), in STATE INTERVENTION/STATE ACTION—A U.S. PERSPECTIVE, at 1, 5 (“Attempting to protect
competition by focusing solely on private restraints is like trying to stop the flow of
water at a fork in a stream by blocking only one of the channels. Unless you block
both channels, you are not likely to even slow, much less stop, the flow. Eventually,
all the water will flow toward the unblocked channel.”).
148. While beyond the scope of this Article, many of the same arguments
made with respect to a locality’s exercise of its zoning power apply to licensing
which is a central police power function of local government. See Ohm, supra note
114, at 631 (discussing local government licensing of the sale of alcoholic
beverages).
149. 159 P.3d 33 (Cal. 2007).
150. See id. at 42. See generally Skye L. Daley, The Gray Zone in the Power of Local
Municipalities: Where Zoning Authority Clashes with State Law, 5 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 215, 220 n.30 (2012).
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ular, that “[a] zoning ordinance which serves some established purpose of
zoning is not necessarily invalid simply because it has the additional effect
of limiting competition.”151 In the court’s view, a zoning action should be
upheld even if the regulation of economic competition reasonably can be
viewed as a direct and intended effect of a challenged zoning action, so
long as the “primary purpose” of the zoning action is to achieve a valid
public purpose, and not to advance an impermissible anticompetitive purpose.152 The California Supreme Court provided the following as illustrative examples of impermissible anticompetitive purposes: “securing a
financial advantage or monopoly position for the benefit of a favored business or individual or imposing a disadvantage on an unpopular business
or individual.”153
In support of this judicial approach, the court cited to several appellate cases including, among others, Van Sicklen v. Browne.154 In this case,
the petitioner-landowner applied for a conditional use permit to construct
an automobile service station in the Highway Service (“HS”) District.155
The city denied the landowner’s application on the grounds, inter alia,
that a proliferation of service stations already existed in the area and that
there was, therefore, no demonstrated need for an additional station at
that location at that time.156 On appeal, the landowner claimed that the
city had denied the conditional use permit “for economic rather than
planning considerations resulting in an invalid attempt to regulate competition through zoning laws.”157 The California Court of Appeals upheld
the city’s denial of the use permit, stating that “[i]ntensity of land use is a
well-recognized and valid city concern and relates to both health and
safety factors and to proper zoning practices” and “encompasses within its
purview the degree of saturation in a particular area of land devoted to
automobile service stations.”158
Similarly, in Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council,159 the city
council denied plaintiff’s request for permission to build a neighborhood
shopping center on the grounds that the city had recently zoned property
in a nearby area to permit construction of a neighborhood shopping
center and that the city did not believe that the surrounding residential
151. Hernandez, 159 P.3d at 41 (quoting 1 ANDERSON’S AMERICAN LAW OF ZON§ 7.28, p. 807 (4th ed. 1996) (“The simple division of the community into
districts has an inherent and profound effect on the real estate market, because
some land is withdrawn from the commercial market and placed in the residential
market . . . . ” (quoting 1 ANDERSON’S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 7.28, p. 807)).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 42.
154. 92 Cal. Rptr. 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
155. See id. at 787–89.
156. See id. at 787–88.
157. Id. at 789.
158. Id. at 790.
159. 137 Cal. Rptr. 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
ING
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population could financially support two competing shopping centers.160
Although the city’s denial of plaintiff’s rezoning request had the direct
and intended effect of regulating competition among private businesses,
California Court of Appeals nevertheless upheld the validity of the city’s
action on appeal. The court concluded that the “primary purpose” of the
city’s regulation of competition was not to further or disadvantage a private business, but, rather, to serve the city’s legitimate public interest in
carefully planning or controlling the pace or location of economic growth
within the city.161
Finally, in Wal-Mart Stores v. City of Turlock,162 the city of Turlock enacted a zoning ordinance that prohibited the development of so-called
discount superstores anywhere in the city.163 In explaining the rationale
underlying the restriction on discount superstores, the ordinance set forth
a series of findings, including that “the establishment of discount superstores [in the city] is likely to negatively impact the vitality and economic
viability of the city’s neighborhood commercial centers by drawing sales
away from traditional supermarkets located in these centers” and that
“smaller stores within a neighborhood center rely upon the foot traffic
generated by the grocery store for their existence and in neighborhood
centers where the grocery store closes, vacancy rates typically increase and
deterioration takes place in the remaining center[.]”164 Wal-Mart filed an
action challenging the validity of the ordinance on several grounds, including that the ordinance exceeded the city’s police powers because the
ordinance was “designed to suppress economic competition and is not reasonably related to the public welfare[.]”165 Rejecting this contention, the
California Court of Appeals held that although a zoning ordinance may
not legitimately be used to control economic competition, a zoning ordinance may be used to further the city’s legitimate public interest in avoiding the decay that might result from economic competition.166
In Hernandez, the California Supreme Court, as a matter of first impression, addressed the question of whether a municipality may enact a
zoning ordinance that regulates economic competition by placing limits
on potentially competing commercial activities or developments in other
parts of the municipality.167 Even if the regulation of economic competition can reasonably be viewed as a direct and intended effect of a zoning
ordinance, the court held that so long as the primary purpose of the ordinance is not the impermissible anticompetitive goal of protecting or dis160. Id. at 306–07.
161. See id. at 310–11.
162. 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 420 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
163. Id. at 421. Discount superstores were defined as large discount stores
with a “full-service grocery department” (which included Wal-Mart). Id. at 425.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 438.
166. Id. at 439–41.
167. See Hernandez v. City of Hanford, 159 P.3d 33, 44 (Cal. 2007).
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advantaging a favored or disfavored business or individual, but, rather, is
the advancement of a legitimate government interest, such as the preservation of a downtown business district for the benefit of the local community
as a whole, the ordinance reasonably relates to the general welfare of the
municipality and, therefore, constitutes a legitimate exercise of the municipality’s police power.168 In assessing the validity of a zoning ordinance
intended, at least in part, to regulate economic competition, a court must
determine if the “primary purpose” of the enacted ordinance—meaning
its principal and ultimate objective—is to promote a legitimate public purpose, and not to advance an impermissible anticompetitive purpose, such
as the exclusion of an unpopular company from the community.169 Even
though the zoning ordinance in question was expressly intended to insulate incumbent retail furniture stores in the downtown commercial district
from competition with other furniture stores located elsewhere in the jurisdiction, the California Supreme Court concluded that the zoning action
served multiple purposes including, importantly, a desire to protect and
preserve, as distinct from any given individual retail furniture store itself,
the general “economic viability” of the city’s downtown commercial
district.170
In assessing the soundness of this judicial approach, it is initially unclear why anticompetitive effect is a concern only if the principal and ultimate objective of the enacted ordinance is to promote an impermissible
private anticompetitive purpose. Under this approach, a zoning ordinance passes judicial muster no matter the magnitude of the anticompetitive impact so long as the primary purpose of the legislation is to achieve a
valid non-anticompetitive purpose: if the locality can establish that the primary purpose of the zoning ordinance is to advance some other legitimate
government interest, such as preserving the economic viability of a downtown business district, then the locality now has unfettered authority to use
zoning to regulate economic competition among private businesses.171
In theory, the judicial inquiry is better focused upon the magnitude
of the anticompetitive effect, and not upon the extent to which this effect
is the “principal and ultimate objective” for the government action.172 Assuming an ordinance promotes more than one purpose how should a
court identify which of the several competing purposes is primary? While
168. See id.; see also Sprenger, Grubb & Assocs. v. City of Hailey, 903 P.2d 741
(Idaho 1995) (responding to claim that rezoning action was an invalid exercise of
police powers to protect downtown merchants from retail competition and holding that preserving aesthetic values and economic viability of a community downtown business core is an appropriate exercise of police power and does not
constitute “protection from competition” because city has not disallowed market
entry, only required that new businesses locate in or around the downtown business core).
169. See Hernandez, 159 P.3d at 44–45.
170. Id. at 35.
171. See id.; see also Wal-Mart, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 425.
172. Hernandez, 159 P.3d at 44.
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any anticompetitive effect standing alone is surely too broad given that, as
the Hernandez court itself correctly noted, almost all zoning has some material impact upon economic competition.173 Primary purpose, on the
other hand, is surely too narrow given the relative ease with which a local
government can manufacture an alternate primary purpose for a zoning
ordinance whose true primary purpose is, in fact, anticompetitive.174 As
discussed in Part I, a more sensible test would attempt to balance the private anticompetitive effect of a zoning ordinance against other socially
beneficial non-anticompetitive objectives.
Although lax judicial scrutiny of restrictive zoning actions may reveal
a recognition on the part of the judiciary that land use regulation is better
left in the hands of legislatures, the lack of substantive judicial review too
easily allows a local government to use its zoning power to substitute its
own judgment of expected consumer demand for that of the market itself.
In Van Sicklen, for example, the city denied plaintiff a conditional use permit to construct an automobile service station because the city believed
that there was no demonstrated need for an additional station at that location at that time.175 Arguably, this assessment is better made by natural
free market forces rather than by local government.
Similarly, in Ensign, the city council denied plaintiff’s request for permission to build a neighborhood shopping center, because the city did not
believe that the surrounding residential population could financially support two competing shopping centers.176 Again, the market, and not local
government, would appear better able to determine if the residential population can, in fact, support two shopping centers. In both Wal-Mart and
Hernandez, local governments used their zoning powers to enact ordinances that served to insulate existing businesses from increased economic competition based on the belief that market entry would result in
business failure, and, in turn, urban or suburban decay,177 or would otherwise threaten the economic viability of a particular commercial district.178
Whether the local government’s justification for the zoning action focuses
on market demand directly or on the consequences of a lack of market
demand indirectly, the gist of the zoning action is the same: in all of these
cases, local government has used zoning to implement or to maintain a
particular market structure that it believes is socially efficient in lieu of
173. See id. at 41 (recognizing that any zoning ordinance will bear some relation to local economic competition, no matter how slight).
174. See Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH.
L. REV. 1355, 1398 (2016) (discussing the possibility of a local government contriving a permissible primary purpose to disguise a true, anticompetitive purpose).
175. See Van Sicklen v. Browne, 92 Cal. Rptr. 786, 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
176. See Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304,
306–07 (Cal. Ct .App. 1977).
177. See Wal-Mart Stores v. City of Turlock, 41 Cal. Rptr.3d 420, 425 (2006).
178. See Hernandez, 159 P.3d at 35.
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what would have otherwise obtained, organically, as a natural byproduct of
market supply and demand.
Forecasting market demand for specific consumer products or services is not a proper objective of commercial land use regulation. As discussed in Part II.B, zoning law is best understood as a mechanism to
reduce expected conflicts related to land use.179 If a local government
genuinely believes that a particular business is likely to generate externalities that would negatively impact other property owners, such as traffic
congestion, then zoning represents a proper response to that legitimate
public concern. In assessing such potential negative externalities, however, that may be created by market entry, the government’s operating
baseline assumption must be that the market entrant will be financially
successful. A local government should not take it upon itself to forecast a
lack of market demand and speculate as to the social costs created by this
expected business failure. The best gauge of market demand is the market itself. Entrepreneurs intend for their business ventures to succeed and
very often personally invest or borrow substantial amounts of money to
finance the new business.180 Before assuming this personal risk, an entrepreneur can expect to spend a considerable amount of time and effort
developing a keen understanding of the local market, and, specifically,
whether sufficient consumer demand exists to operate the business profitably.181 The owner will open the business only if the owner rationally believes that the market demand is there to support the business. Local
government, by contrast, is not as invested, less informed, and more susceptible to the distorting influence of special interest groups who may
stand to benefit financially if the market entrant should fail.182 While a
failed business can, of course, create various forms of social costs,183 these
speculative harms do not justify government interference in free markets.
In the end, the market, and not local government, must determine market
demand for the business. Government interference is warranted only in179. See supra Section I.B.1.
180. See, e.g., William B. Gartner et al., Financing the Emerging Firm, 39 SMALL
BUS. ECON. 745, 753 (2012) (outlining various financing techniques used by entrepreneurs at the outset of a new business venture); see also Howard E. Van Auken,
Obstacles to Business Start-up, 4 J. DEV. ENTREPRENEURSHIP 175 (1999) (presenting
survey results indicating that risk tolerance is an important common obstacle
presenting new business owners). See generally S. M. Ravi Kanbur, Entrepreneurial
Risk Taking, Inequality, and Public Policy: An Application of Inequality Decomposition
Analysis to the General Equilibrium Effects of Progressive Taxation, 90 J. POL. ECON. 1
(1982) (explaining the calculated nature of entrepreneurial risk-taking).
181. See, e.g., Market Research and Competitive Analysis, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.
(Mar. 1, 2021, 5:30 PM), https://www.sba.gov/business-guide/plan-your-business/
market-research-competitive-analysis [https://perma.cc/F6X4-L9WC].
182. See supra Section I.A.2.
183. See W.C. Bunting, How the Law Can Better Protect Small Business Owners
Against Location Risk in the Brick-and-Mortar Retail Sector, AM. BUS. L.J. (forthcoming
2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3554435 [https://
perma.cc/LJC9-KS6C].
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sofar as a successful business does not internalize the external costs that it
creates as a going concern.
Even if courts were generally less willing to allow a local government
to substitute its own prognostications of expected market demand for that
of potential private market entrants, agreeing that such determinations
are better left to the free market itself, the practical effect of this shift in
judicial approach is unlikely to provide a sufficient check on the anticompetitive impact of commercial land use regulation. To prevent market entry, rather than cite to market structure, a local government can simply
claim that the purpose of the restrictive zoning is to prevent some type of
social disorder that detrimentally impacts the quality of life in the local
community, such as increased criminal activity, loitering, vagrancy, increased traffic, noise, odor, litter, environmental pollution, or more nebulous public concerns relating to aesthetic considerations—all of which are
legitimate government interests.184 Eliminating considerations of expected market demand as legitimate government interests merely compels
a local government purely motivated by an anticompetitive purpose to
provide some other pretextual rationale for its decision to deny market
entry.185 Accordingly, to prevent the anticompetitive impact of zoning,
the challenge for land use policy is to identify and disallow those zoning
actions where the legitimate state interest purportedly advanced by the
zoning action is largely pretextual: the key to surmounting this challenge
lies in the second prong of the rational basis test.
b.

Rational Relationship

To satisfy rational basis review, state action must bear a “rational relationship” to the legitimate government interest.186 To determine if a rational relationship exists, a court may assume “the existence of any
necessary state of fact which [the court] can reasonably conceive in determining if a rational relationship exists between the challenged law and a
legitimate government interest.”187 The Supreme Court has defined this
type of judicial review broadly, stating that an ordinance must be upheld
so long as “there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
184. See, e.g., Kern Cty., Cal., Cannabis Land Use Ordinance 2017-320 (Oct.
24, 2017). See generally D. Don Welch, Legitimate Government Purposes and State Enforcement of Morality, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 67 (1993) (contextualizing a local government’s duty to prevent social disorder amid the legitimate governmental interests
that may motivate zoning ordinances).
185. See, e.g., Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 174, at 1398 (discussing how it is
possible for a government agency to articulate a plausible pretext for an otherwise
bad (however defined) reason for its decision). See generally Thomas J. Miles &
Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761
(2008).
186. E.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (enunciating the legal
standard inherent to rational basis review).
187. Amunrud v. Bd. of Appeals, 143 P.3d 571, 578 (Wash. 2006) (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).
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provide a rational basis for the classification[,]”188 and that “those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden ‘to negative every conceivable basis which might support it[.]’”189 Rational basis
review is not a genuine effort to determine the legislature’s actual reasons
for enacting a statute, nor to inquire into whether a statute does, in fact,
further a legitimate government interest.190 Although this standard sets a
high bar for a challenger to meet, a court must still be assured that a
legislative decision was reached in a fair manner.191
Because the regulation of economic competition among private businesses cannot be a legitimate government interest, a local government
seeking to enact a zoning action motivated by anticompetitive purpose
must claim some other public interest as a pretext for the exercise of its
zoning power. Given this, the key inquiry under rational basis review of
commercial land use regulation is not whether the zoning action promotes a legitimate public interest, but, rather, whether the zoning action
is rationally related to the government’s stated interest. For the rationally
related requirement to act as a meaningful check on zoning power, as distinguished from the local government’s more general police powers, this Article contends that a local government must be required to produce
evidence of a causal link between a zoning action and the stated government interest. This differs from standard rational basis review of more
general police power actions that can “be based on rational speculation
unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”192 In other words, in the
narrower context of a zoning action, the claim set forth here is that the
question of whether a zoning action is rational related to a legitimate government interest can be rephrased as follows: does there exist a causal link
between the zoning action and the stated government interest?
Accepting this as a plausible standard of review for a locality’s exercise
of zoning power, the question is what type of empirical evidence a local
government must adduce to establish proof of a causal link.193 Given the
188. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
189. Id. at 314–15 (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts, 410 U.S.
356, 364 (1973)).
190. See Jackson, supra note 112, at 493.
191. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (justifying heightened burden by emphasizing the court’s need to ensure fair and transparent legislative decision-making).
192. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315; see also Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302,
326 (2012) (“Congress rationally could have concluded that adherence to Berne
‘promotes the diffusion of knowledge[.]’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Brief for
Petitioners at 4, Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302)). See generally DEBORAH HELLMAN,
WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 115 (2008) (describing rationality for equal protection review as requiring mere positive correlation).
193. Under standard rational basis review, there is no requirement that a
proffered rational inference be the one, in fact, held by the legislature enacting
the provision. See, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (“It is,
of course, constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlies the
legislative decision . . . . ”); see also Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of Rational
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omnipresent specter of anticompetitive impact, a local government cannot
merely posit a plausible causal link, blithely stating, without additional evidentiary support, that a zoning restriction will promote a legitimate public
interest. Local governments must do more. Unlike more general police
powers, Part III argues that a local government should be compelled to
produce some verifiable empirical evidence to support the existence of a
causal link between the zoning restriction and the stated government interest for the zoning action to represent a valid exercise of zoning power
under rational basis review.
III. PROPOSED REGULATORY APPROACH
In highlighting the anticompetitive impact of commercial land use
regulation, this Article contends that current legal safeguards, including
the antitrust laws and rational basis review as presently applied, are insufficient to protect local communities against the anticompetitive effects of
commercial land use regulation. This Article rejects antitrust law as the
proper doctrinal vehicle through which to curb the anticompetitive impact of commercial zoning restrictions and instead suggests a three-part
administrative procedure, grounded in notions of due process and a locality’s legitimate exercise of zoning power, to reduce the frequency with
which local governments impose socially inefficient restrictions on commercial land use.
A.

Antitrust Approach

To start, this Section reviews the arguments for and against immunity
from antitrust liability as set forth by the majority and the dissent in Omni
and presents a slightly different argument, based upon the proper scope
of antitrust law, for why the exercise of zoning power by local governments
should be immune from antitrust liability.
1.

Majority Opinion

Omni is a peculiar case in that Justice Scalia, who may be viewed as
having generally sought to curb government regulation of private business,194 authors a majority opinion that, in granting local governments
immunity from federal antitrust liability, expands the capacity of local governments to regulate free market competition. In arguing that antitrust
liability compromises the ability of state governments to “regulate their
Basis Review, 102 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1650–52 (2016) (discussing how rational basis
test particular understanding of rationality divorced from actual legislative
reasoning).
194. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013)
(finding that prohibitively high cost of arbitration was not sufficient reason to invalidate class action waiver because waiver did not ultimately restrict a party’s right
to pursue remedies via an arbitral forum); see also AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,
563 U.S. 333 (2011) (holding that Federal Arbitration Act preempted California’s
attempt to invalidate arbitration agreements).
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domestic commerce[,]” Justice Scalia echoes the Chicago school of political economy, describing local governments as generally capable of regulating commercial land use in a socially optimal manner.195 Consistent with
a belief in the general efficiency of the political process, Justice Scalia describes the influence of special interest groups in government decisionmaking as not necessarily disfavored, but, rather, as an “inevitable and desirable” part of a political process that can normally be relied upon to yield
efficient public policy outcomes.196 Because government officials will
often comply with the urgings of special interest groups, Justice Scalia rejects extending a broadly defined conspiracy exception to Noerr immunity,
suggesting that this would render most, if not all, zoning regulation vulnerable to a conspiracy charge.197 Further, Justice Scalia contends that
conspiracy cannot be sensibly limited to governmental acts “‘not in the
public interest.’”198 Many, if not all, government actions, including land
use regulation, can be described as benefiting the private economic interests of specific groups at the expense of the public more broadly.199 Allowing government action, such as the city of Columbia’s decision to
regulate “billboard jungles,” to be made subject to this type of ex post
facto judicial assessment of “the public interest” would only compromise
what Justice Scalia views as the otherwise broadly efficient regulation of
domestic commerce by local governments.200
2.

Dissenting Opinion

The dissent in Omni presents a vastly different view of local government. Echoing the Virginia school of political economy, Justice Stevens
contends that local government cannot be safely relied upon to resist the
distorting influence of special interest groups who seek some type of private benefit at the expense of the public interest, with the facts in Omni
itself serving as a compelling example of how special interest groups can
push local government officials to act contrary to the public interest.201
195. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., 499 U.S. 365, 377 (1991)
(“Parker was not written in ignorance of the reality that determination of ‘the public interest’ in the manifold areas of government regulation entails not merely economic and mathematical analysis but value judgment . . . .”). At the very least,
local government is better suited than juries to perform this complex weighing of
social costs and benefits. See id. (stating that antitrust immunity prevents a shift in
the determination of public interest “from elected officials to judges and juries”).
196. Id. at 375.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 376.
199. Id. at 377 (“The California marketing scheme at issue in Parker itself, for
example, can readily be viewed as the result of a ‘conspiracy’ to put the ‘private’
interest of the State’s raisin growers above the ‘public’ interest of the State’s
consumers.”).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 386 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“After a 3-week trial, a jury found that,
despite the city fathers’ denials, there was an agreement motivated by past favors in
the form of political advertising, by friendship, and by the expectation of a benefi-
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Specifically, the dissent argues that the majority has erroneously transformed a private anticompetitive agreement between local political officials and an incumbent business into a lawful exercise of public decisionmaking.202 Even without the corrupting influence of special interest
groups, the dissent contends that local governments, unlike state governments, are “more apt to promote narrow parochial interests ‘without regard to extraterritorial impact and regional efficiency.’”203 In the
dissent’s view, regulation of domestic commerce by local governments,
which are principally influenced by special interest groups or other parochial concerns, can have significant anticompetitive effects that undermine Congress’ comprehensive national policy to protect economic
competition.204
In response to this posited government failure, the dissent offers the
federal antitrust laws as a check on the capacity of local government to
enter into private anticompetitive agreements, exhibiting far more optimism than the majority in the capacity of courts to invalidate legislative
action motivated by anticompetitive purpose. The dissent insists that juries are perfectly “capable of recognizing the difference between independent municipal action and action taken for the sole purpose of carrying
out anticompetitive agreement for the private party.”205 As a counter to a
political process that tends towards inefficiency, juries can be safely relied
upon to strike down, as a violation of the federal antitrust laws, any zoning
action that is the product of an agreement solely intended to elevate private interests over the general public interest.206 While expressly acknowledging the inherent difficulty of proving whether an agreement truly
motivated a specific course of conduct, the dissent does not believe that
this concern alone should deter a court from exempting those illegal
agreements that are proven by convincing evidence.207 In its view, such
problems of proof are better addressed through heightened evidentiary
standards, and not, as the majority contends, through judicial expansion
of exemptions from the Sherman Act.208
cial future relationship—and not by a concern for the public interest more
generally.”).
202. Id. at 397.
203. Id. at 389 (quoting Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 404
(1978)); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (describing the greater
tendency of smaller societies to promote oppressive and narrow interests above the
common good).
204. Omni, 499 U.S. at 389–90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 395–96; see also In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d
1069, 1079 (3d Cir. 1980) (“The law presumes that a jury will find facts and reach a
verdict by rational means. It does not contemplate scientific precision but does
contemplate a resolution of each issue on the basis of a fair and reasonable assessment of the evidence and a fair and reasonable application of the relevant legal
rules.”).
206. See Omni, 499 U.S. at 396 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 396–97.
208. Id. at 397.
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Alternative View

Notwithstanding whether juries can, in fact, identify legislative action
solely intended to advance specific private interests over the general public interest, the majority is surely correct to assert that this scenario represents a “polar extreme[.]”209 As Justice Scalia puts it: “‘[i]ndependent
municipal action’ is unobjectionable, ‘action taken for the sole purpose of
carrying out an anticompetitive agreement for the private party’ is unlawful, and everything else (that is, the known world between the two poles) is
unaddressed.”210 Recall that Section II.B made a similar point in connection with the primary purpose test that courts have relied upon to assess
the anticompetitive impact of a zoning action under rational basis review.
To the extent that legislative action promotes more than one purpose, the
dissent—like proponents of the primary purpose test—commits a similar
error in failing to explain how a jury can properly identify which of several
competing purposes is, in fact, primary.211 Moreover, the emphasis on purpose, rather than on net social impact, is similarly misplaced. The real
challenge facing zoning is not simply to identify and strike down zoning
actions with an anticompetitive impact, but, rather, to prevent zoning actions where the anticompetitive harm exceeds the social benefits of
greater land use regulation.
Framed in this way, antitrust laws cannot, contrary to what the dissent
asserts, solve this key challenge. The cost-benefit analysis required to identify efficient zoning sits beyond the scope of the antitrust laws insofar as
anticompetitive harm, which, of course, lies within the proper domain of
the antitrust laws, must be weighed against social benefits that are not related to economic competition and which do not properly lie within the
domain of antitrust law. Under this view of Omni, the majority is right to
hold that antitrust liability should not attach, although the reasoning may
be flawed. Rather than locate immunity from federal antitrust liability in
principles of federalism and state sovereignty, this Article contends that
such immunity follows from the observation that antitrust law is simply the
wrong doctrinal vehicle through which to assess if a restriction on commercial land use is social welfare increasing. As discussed, anticompetitive
impact is only one factor, among many others that are entirely unrelated
to economic competition, that must be carefully considered in a much
broader balancing of social costs and benefits to correctly assess the efficiency of a restrictive zoning ordinance.
Having rejected antitrust liability as the appropriate means by which
to ensure efficient zoning, the majority in Omni is content to leave the
exercise of zoning power, unchecked by the federal antitrust laws, in the
209. Id. at 375 n.5.
210. Id.
211. See supra Section II.B.2.
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hands of local government.212 While this Article likewise rejects the federal antitrust laws as a valid constraint upon the exercise of a locality’s
zoning power, this Article does not share the majority’s optimistic view of
local government in which legislative decision-making tends towards efficiency. Instead, this Article agrees with the dissent that the facts in Omni
provide a striking example of how special interests can influence local government officials to take legislative action with significant anticompetitive
harm to the public.213
Accordingly, neither the majority nor the dissent in Omni provide an
entirely satisfactory approach to curbing the anticompetitive impact of
commercial land use regulation. The next Subsection proposes a solution
that relies neither upon a belief in the general efficiency of the political
process (as does the majority in Omni) nor upon an unduly expansive view
of the federal antitrust laws (as does the dissent in Omni) but, instead,
places substantial weight upon the formal administrative process by which
local governments enact restrictions on local land use.
B.

Administrative Approach

This Section proposes a three-part administrative procedure as a
check on the anticompetitive impact of commercial land use regulation.
1.

Statutory Right to Challenge

For this proposed administrative procedure to work, the applicable
enabling legislation must authorize challenges to the validity of a zoning
ordinance based upon anticompetitive impact.214 Under the enabling legislation, a business owner seeking to challenge the validity of a zoning on
substantive grounds, could be authorized to submit a challenge, coupled
perhaps with a request for a curative amendment, to the local governing
body detailing the anticompetitive impact of the proposed zoning action.
In response, the governing body may be instructed to refer this challenge
to a planning commission that then decides whether to make a recommend approval of the challenge (and curative amendment) to the governing body. Part of this review process might include public hearings in
which residents are invited to offer public comment on the proposed zon212. See Omni, 499 U.S. at 377 (establishing the majority’s deference to local
governments regarding zoning ordinances).
213. See id. at 386 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214. See, e.g., 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10916.1 (West 2001) (authorizing a challenge to the validity of a zoning ordinance when its provisions prohibit or unduly restrict a legitimate use); see also Hock v. Bd. of Supervisors, 622
A.2d 431, 433 (Pa. Commw. 1993) (holding that an ordinance that prohibits a
lawful use throughout the municipality or is duly restrictive is unconstitutional).
See generally Jan Z. Krasnowiecki & L.B. Kregenow, Zoning and Planning Litigation
Procedures Under the Revised Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, 39 VILL. L.
REV. 879 (1994).
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ing action.215 If the governing body, in consultation with the planning
commission, determines that the challenge has merit, then the governing
body can either accept the business owner’s curative amendment, with or
without revision, or adopt an alternative amendment that cures the challenged defects of the proposed land use regulation.
2.

Three-Part Test

This Subsection describes in greater detail how a statutory right to
challenge a zoning restriction based upon anticompetitive impact might
operate in practice. Specifically, the following three-part administrative
procedure is proposed as part of the process by which zoning restrictions
on commercial land use are enacted by local governments.
•

First, a business owner must make out a prima facie case of
anticompetitive impact, submitting to the governing body an
“economic impact statement” that establishes the extent to
which the proposed zoning action acts as a barrier to entry.
• Second, if the business owner succeeds in making out a prima
facie case of anticompetitive impact, then the governing body
now bears the burden of proof to show that the challenged
zoning action is rationally related to a legitimate government
interest. If the governing body cannot do so, then a challenger’s claim of anticompetitive impact must prevail.
• Third, if the governing body has satisfied its burden of proof
at step two, then the burden of proof shifts back to the business owner to establish that the zoning action is not rationally
related to a legitimate government interest. If the business
owner cannot do so, then the challenge to the zoning action
fails.
Each step in this proposed three-step procedure is examined in
greater detail below.
a.

Prima Facie Case

Although the enactment of a zoning ordinance by local government
is generally presumed to be a valid and constitutional exercise of its legislative authority,216 this Article contends that a challenger should be allowed
to make out a prima facie case rebutting this presumption by demonstrating that the exercise of zoning power in question completely excludes a
lawful commercial land use. Indeed, even if the zoning ordinance does
not completely prohibit a legitimate commercial land use on its face, a
challenger should still be permitted to make out a prima facie case if the
215. See generally William H. Baker et al., Critical Factors for Enhancing Municipal
Public Hearings, 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 490 (2005) (listing criteria for improving public hearings and encouraging public participation).
216. See supra Section II.B.2.
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ordinance substantially impacts the ability of the business owner to operate in the jurisdiction. Importantly, to establish a prima facie case of anticompetitive impact, the challenger need not prove an “antitrust injury”
under this proposed framework—which can be extremely costly and timeconsuming.217 Rather, the challenger need only submit an economic impact statement that displays where the business can legally locate in the
jurisdiction given the proposed zoning ordinance. The purpose of the
impact statement is not to estimate a price effect or establish some other
type of anticompetitive harm, but simply to illustrate the extent to which
the zoning action restricts where the business can locate spatially within
the jurisdiction.
Voters are in the best position to trade off the expected social costs
and benefits of a proposed zoning action of commercial land use. To perform this calculus properly, however, voters must be fully informed and
correctly understand the true impact of the zoning action. Voters do not
necessarily need to know the approximate price effect of a zoning restriction.218 But, at a minimum, the electorate appreciate the extent to which
the zoning action, in restricting where businesses can locate, reduces consumer choice. The contention is that providing voters with even only a
general sense of the geographic impact of a zoning action will, in many
cases, sufficiently incentivize voters, who do not know the exact impact on
market prices, to push back against restrictive zoning when the anticompetitive impact of a proposed zoning exceeds the corresponding social benefits. That is, the core objective of the economic impact statement is purely
to bring greater transparency to an administrative process that can often
appear inscrutable to those unfamiliar with the legalities of commercial
land use regulation in order to magnify public resistance to the distorting
influence of certain special interest groups.219
Unlike proof of antitrust injury that often requires a considerable expenditure of time and money,220 the economic impact statement produced as part of the challenger’s prima facie case can consist of nothing
more than a map that visually displays the areas in which the challenger is
permitted to locate under the proposed zoning restrictions. The map
might show, for instance, that the proposed ordinance completely excludes market entry by the challenger in which case the challenger can be
217. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Jacobsen, Tackling the Time and Cost of Antirust Litigation, 32 ANTITRUST 3, 3 (2017) (“Antitrust cases can take forever and cost a fortune.”). See generally Ronald W. Davis, Standing on Shaky Ground: The Strangely
Elusive Doctrine of Antitrust Injury, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 697 (2003) (delineating the
paradoxical nature of establishing a justiciable claim for antitrust injury).
218. See generally Jonathan B. Baker & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Methods
in Antitrust Litigation: Review and Critique, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 386 (1999).
219. See Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, supra note 34, at 374.
220. See Jacobsen, supra note 217, at 3.
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deemed to have made out a prima facie case of anticompetitive impact.221
A more difficult question arises, however, where a business, while not excluded completely from the local market, is significantly restricted in
where it may operate under the proposed zoning ordinance. Consider
medical marijuana dispensaries in Philadelphia.
The figure below shows where in Philadelphia a medical marijuana
dispensary would be permitted to locate under certain proposed city zoning restrictions.222
FIGURE 1. PROPOSED MEDICAL MARIJUANA DISPENSARY ZONING
RESTRICTIONS IN PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

221. In the case of an express ban, an economic impact statement would be
unnecessary because the ban itself constitutes prima facie evidence of antitrust
injury. See, e.g., Krista-Ann M. Staley & Jenn L. Malik, The Whereabouts of Weed: Zoning Implications of the Medical Marijuana Act, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Feb. 19, 2019),
https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/2019/02/14/the-whereabouts-ofweed-zoning-implications-of-the-medical-marijuana-act/ [https://perma.cc/T3PLHNVC] (discussing how outright ban on cannabis dispensaries is likely illegal in
Pennsylvania under the local zoning enabling legislation that authorizes a challenge to validity of zoning ordinance when its provisions prohibit or unduly restrict
a legitimate use); see also Hock v. Bd. of Supervisors, 622 A.2d 431, 433 (Pa.
Commw. 1993) (holding that an ordinance that prohibits a lawful use throughout
municipality, or is duly restrictive, is unconstitutional).
222. See Ken Steif, Mapping Philly’s Proposed Marijuana Dispensary Zoning Restrictions, URB. SPATIAL, http://urbanspatialanalysis.com/mapping-phillys-proposedmarijuana-dispensary-zoning-restrictions/ [https://perma.cc/LV9S-EC75] (last visited Sept. 5, 2021).
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The land area where proposed dispensaries can locate is quite small
and, in many cases, corresponds to areas where a commercial business
may not particularly wish to locate, such as along a remote industrial waterfront.223 This spatial analysis raises the following question: if the area
in which a business is permitted to locate represents a relatively small—but
non-zero—percentage of the total land area in the jurisdiction, can this
still constitute prima facie evidence of anticompetitive impact? In this particular case, the answer may be yes. In general, the answer is likely to
depend upon whether the calculated percentage lies below some predetermined threshold, with the value of that threshold varying across
jurisdictions.
b.

Burden-Shifting

If the business owner succeeds in making out a prima facie case of
anticompetitive impact, then the burden of proof shifts to the local government to establish that the zoning action is, in fact, rationally related to
a legitimate government interest. As noted in Section II.B.2, the key question here is the extent to which a legislative body must rely upon empirical
evidence of a causal impact to establish a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.224 At a minimum, to rebut the presumption of
anticompetitive injury, the governing body cannot be allowed to simply
identify some obviously legitimate government interest, such as the reduction of traffic congestion, and state, in a conclusory manner without additional supporting evidence, that the zoning action is expected to promote
this stated interest, especially if credible empirical evidence to the contrary
is likely to be produced by the challenger in the third step of this proposed three-step procedure.225 A proper justification of a zoning ordinance cannot simply be that the restriction is reasonable and necessary to
promote the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community and is consistent with the general plan.226 To allow this as a reasonable justification for a zoning action is to allow a local government to
engage in an exercise of circular logic in which the government, in effect,
justifies an ordinance as rationally related to the objectives of zoning
power by simply stating, tautologically, that the ordinance is rationally related to the objectives of zoning power.227 What objectives of zoning
223. See id.
224. See supra Section II.B.2.
225. See, e.g., Sedona Grand, L.L.C. v. City of Sedona, 270 P.3d 864, 870 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2012) (stating that city must provide evidence beyond mere “legislative
assertion” to carry its burden of demonstrating that the land use law is exempt
pursuant to the public health and safety exception).
226. See, e.g., SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CAL., ZONING ORDINANCE 5281 (Oct. 18,
1978).
227. See Sedona, 270 P.3d at 870 (“[T]he nexus between prohibition of shortterm occupancy and public health is not self-evident, and the governing body must
do more than incant the language of a statutory exception to demonstrate that it is
grounded in actual fact.”).
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power more specifically? And more importantly, how is the ordinance expected to have an observable causal impact upon these objectives?
For the rationally related requirement to act as a meaningful check
on zoning power, as distinguished from a local government’s more general
police powers, this Article contends that a local government, when confronted with prima facie evidence of anticompetitive impact, must be obligated, in consultation with a planning commission, to produce concrete,
empirical evidence of a causal link between the zoning action and the
stated government interest.228 In the case of a zoning action, however,
the absence of such empirical evidence ought to imply that the local government has failed to rebut a presumption of anticompetitive impact.
Even if empirical evidence of a causal link is not required, the governing
body should, at a minimum, be obligated to explain, in writing and with
specificity, how the zoning action can be expected to promote a legitimate
public interest.229
This need for empirical evidence of a causal relationship is, arguably,
most compelling where the local government can be viewed as treating a
challenger differently than similarly situated businesses.230 If the local
government, for example, cites an increase in traffic congestion as the justification for its decision not to allow a business to open in a specific location, then the government, even if a plausible causal link has been
established between the challenger’s business and traffic congestion,
ought to be required to further explain why the challenger’s negative impact on traffic congestion is likely worse than other similarly situated commercial establishments that have been permitted to operate in the same
area. The local government cannot be allowed to prevent market entry at
a specific location because of concerns over increased traffic congestion
only to allow, say, a twenty-four-hour gas station to open in that same location, resulting in a substantial increase in local traffic congestion. Under
these facts, the decision to disallow market entry by the challenger appears
arbitrary and capricious and strongly suggests that the original zoning action was not related to traffic congestion at all.231 If the zoning action is
truly motivated by a desire to control traffic congestion, then this concern
228. Unlike standard rational basis review under which a court need not inquire into whether a statute does, in fact, further a legitimate government interest,
let alone establish a causal link. See Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Beach Commc’ns,
508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (holding that, under rational basis review, a statute can
be based upon “rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data”).
229. See, e.g., A.B.A., MODEL STATUTE ON LOCAL LAND USE PROCESS § 614
(2008).
230. See Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by
Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 780 (1987) (tracing the heightened legal standard
inherent to intermediate scrutiny as opposed to the lower bar inherent to rational
basis review).
231. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937); see also
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555, 561 (1997)
(stating that judicial review of property interests under substantive due process is
deferential to legislative decision-making). See generally James W. Ely, Jr., The Enig-
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ought to apply equally to all similarly situated businesses, and the applicable governing body should be obligated to explain, with particularity, how
the challenger differs from other businesses on the specific issue of traffic
congestion or any other expected negative social impact used to justify the
locality’s exercise of its zoning power.
c.

Pretext

If the governing body has satisfied step two of the proposed three-step
procedure—meaning simply that the planning commission has produced
a report—then the burden of proof shifts back to the challenger to establish that the zoning action is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Specifically, with the report of the planning commission in
hand, the challenger is now given the opportunity to conduct its own competing empirical analysis to establish that there is, in fact, no causal link
between the zoning action and the government’s stated legitimate interest—or, at the very least, that the magnitude of this link has been significantly overstated by the local government—or, more specifically, its
planning commission. If the stated government interest is the reduction
of local traffic congestion, for example, then the challenger can examine
the impact on traffic of similar businesses in other locations and present
an empirical analysis that shows, contrary to the report produced by the
planning commission, that its new business is similarly unlikely to have a
statistically significant impact upon local traffic congestion.
Before rendering its final decision, the governing body can weigh the
validity of both reports to assess if a causal link exists. Although a local
government may, admittedly, hold a bias in favor of the analysis conducted
by its own planning commission, that bias is not necessarily outcome determinative in any given case. Indeed, placing blame on the planning
commission may provide convenient political cover for a zoning action
that, upon being brought to public light, is not so popular with the electorate. Moreover, its final decision is subject to review by a court in the
event of an appeal. Even though courts generally view legislative decisionmaking under the lens of presumed constitutionality, the substantial written record generated as a byproduct of this proposed administrative process may provide a reviewing court with a sufficiently firm evidentiary
footing upon which to rule that an exercise of zoning power fails rational
basis review for lack of a rational relationship between the zoning action
and the local government’s alleged legitimate interest.232
matic Place of Property Rights in Modern Constitutional Theory, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN
MODERN AMERICA 108, 110 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr., eds., 2008).
232. Although this proposed framework is described as a procedural safeguard
intended to reduce voter ignorance of the potential anticompetitive impact of
commercial land use regulation, this three-part procedure also suggests a substantive framework for how a court should assess the validity of a locality’s exercise of
zoning power (as opposed to its police power) pursuant to this administrative procedure under rational basis review.
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CONCLUSION
This Article explored how the anticompetitive impact of a zoning ordinance is assessed under the antitrust laws and substantive due process
and concluded that neither is likely to satisfactorily curb the anticompetitive impact of commercial land use regulation. Highlighting the distinction between a local government’s zoning power and its more general
police power, this Article advanced the claim that for the rationally related
requirement to act as a meaningful check on zoning power, such review
must require a local government to produce evidence of a causal link between a zoning action and the stated government interest, unlike under
standard rational basis review of a police power action which can be based
upon “rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical
data.”233 Rejecting antitrust law as the proper doctrinal vehicle through
which to curb the anticompetitive impact of commercial zoning restrictions, this Article proposed a three-part administrative procedure,
grounded in notions of due process and the legitimate exercise of zoning
power, to reduce the frequency with which local governments impose socially inefficient restrictions on commercial land use. This proposal introduced the concept of an economic impact statement that establishes the
extent to which the proposed zoning action acts as a barrier to entry. Importantly, to make out a prima face case of anticompetitive impact under
the proposed framework, the challenger need not prove an “antitrust injury.” Instead, the challenger need only submit an economic impact statement that displays where the business can locate in the jurisdiction under
the challenged zoning ordinance.
233. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315.
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